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This dissertation broadly looks at farmers’ use of agricultural practices that affect water 
quality in Iowa. Primary themes across these three studies include (1) farmers’ willingness to use 
conservation practices that can improve soil health and water quality, (2) the effects of agri-
environmental policy on adoption of conservation practices, and (3) the effects of land tenure on 
farmers’ use of inputs and conservation practices. 
Chapter 2 examines whether cost-share programs – which pay farmers to use a specific 
conservation practice – have had the desired effect of increasing cover-crop use in Iowa. Using a 
matching estimator, I conclude that cost-share recipients plant cover crops on an additional 15% 
of their farmland than they would have in absence of payment.  
In chapter 3, I study how landowner characteristics affect the use of conservation 
practices. The chapter focuses on whether leasing versus operating owned farmland decreases 
the use of conservation practices. I find that cover crops, buffer strips, and ponds/sediment basins 
are used at lower rates on rented farmland than on owner-operated farmland. However, no-till is 
used at a higher rate on rented farmland compared to owner-operated farmland. I also find that 
non-operator landowners have practices on their farmland at lesser rates than do landowners who 
currently farm. 
Chapter 4 uses data envelopment analysis and a panel of farms to estimate an efficient 
input-output frontier for corn production and calculate farms’ efficiency scores. I then evaluate 
how productivity has changed over time and whether efficiency differs by farm size and land 
tenure. Technical efficiency increased between the first half of the period (2011-2014) and the 
second (2015-2018). Additionally, I find that larger farms are more technically efficient than 





CHAPTER 1.    GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural pollution has been a leading cause of the water-quality issues of increasing 
concern throughout the United States. Harmful Algal Blooms and excessive nitrate levels have 
caused drinking-water treatment crises in municipalities and negatively impacted water 
recreation throughout the Midwest. On a global scale, nutrient pollution has been a primary 
contributor to the hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico – an area of low oxygen that has been 
detrimental to aquatic life. Agriculture in the Upper Mississippi River Basin (Figure 1.1) is 
estimated to be responsible for 43% of the nitrogen and 27% of the phosphorus delivered to the 
Gulf of Mexico (Aulenbach et al. 2007). To address these water-quality issues, Iowa developed 
the Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy (INRS) (2017) to provide a science-based framework to 
evaluate best practices to achieve the goal of reducing nitrogen and phosphorus loss by 41% and 
29%, respectively.1 
One method used to reduce nutrient pollution is nutrient management since fertilizer has 
been a significant contributor to water-quality issues. However, nutrient management alone may 
be insufficient to combat the water issues, so the INRS also recommends the use of conservation 
practices. The INRS finds cover crops, buffer strips, sediment basins, and land retirement to be 
the practices most effective at reducing nitrogen and includes those practices along with no-till to 
be most effective at reducing phosphorus loads. However, due to the high costs (both implicit 
and explicit) of implementing these practices, adoption is low; thus, the U.S. government 
allocates money to voluntary conservation programs, which pay farmers to use environmentally 
beneficial practices. There has been a notable shift in conservation policy in recent decades, with 
                                                 
1 The Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force had the twelve states along the Mississippi 





a transfer in funding from land retirement programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) to working lands programs such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) 
(Figure 1.2). The research presented in this dissertation focuses on the economics of 
conservation practices funded primarily through working lands programs. 
The overall goal of this dissertation is to evaluate farmers’ willingness to use 
management practices that reduce the negative externalities agriculture has on waterways. I 
present three separate but related studies in the subsequent chapters. The first study, in Chapter 2, 
evaluates agri-environmental policy by estimating the effectiveness of cost-share programs at 
increasing cover-crop use. I then explore the cost-effectiveness of the policy by analyzing 
program’s cost of reducing nitrogen pollution. 
Chapter 3 analyzes determinants of conservation-practice use, with a focus on the 
landowner perspective. In Iowa, distinguishing between landowner and farm operator is 
essential, since over half of the state’s farmland is rented out to a tenant, and owner-operators 
and tenants’ incentives for adoption may differ. The analysis considers four conservation 
practices: no-till, cover crops, buffer strips, and sediment basins. In particular, I explore how 
land tenure (whether farmland is owner-operated or rented) and the landowner’s farming 
experience affect the use of conservation practices. The chapter concludes by continuing the 
analysis of agri-environmental policy, this time focusing on the landowner perspective as 
opposed to the farm operator perspective, as was studied in chapter 2. I do so by looking at how 
the adoption of the four studied practices could evolve under three potential agricultural policy 
regimes.  
Lastly, chapter 4 looks at how efficiency of corn production by Iowa farms differs by 





maximum proportional reduction of all inputs a farm could undertake, while still producing the 
same output level. The second model calculates the extent to which a farm could reduce fertilizer 
use, holding other inputs constant, while maintaining the same output level. Unlike the other two 
chapters, which consider conservation practices that reduce nutrient runoff, this study directly 
addresses one aspect of nutrient management by evaluating the extent to which farmers use 
fertilizer beyond the technically efficient level. 
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Figure 1.1     Map of the Mississippi River Basin and Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone. (Source: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) 
 
 






CHAPTER 2.    ADDITIONALITY IN COVER CROP COST-SHARE PROGRAMS IN 
IOWA: A MATCHING ASSESSMENT 
Wendiam P.M. Sawadgo* and Alejandro Plastina† 
Abstract 
Cover crops can generate both on-farm and water-quality benefits. However, their use in 
Iowa remains subdued, partly due to implementation costs faced by farmers. We test the 
hypothesis that monetary incentives through cost-share programs are effective at increasing the 
area of farmland planted to cover crops in Iowa, using a propensity-score-matching estimator. 
We find that cost-share payments induced a 15 percentage-point expansion in cover-crop acreage 
beyond what would have been planted in the absence of payment, among farmers who 
participated in cost-share programs. In addition, at least half of cost-share expenditures funded 
acres that would not have been planted without payment.  
Introduction 
Row-crop farming in the Midwest remains a major non-point source of nutrient pollution 
to waterways, resulting in mounting pressure on farmers to adopt conservation practices. One 
promising conservation practice is the use of cover crops,1 which the Iowa Nutrient Reduction 
Strategy (2016) lists as one of the practices with the greatest potential for nitrate reduction. Iowa 
fields with cereal rye saw a nitrate loss reduction of 23% (Martinez-Feria et al. 2016), and nitrate 
concentration reductions of 48% and 61% (Kaspar et al. 2007 and 2012). The environmental 
services provided by cover crops in Iowa are not only relevant to manage water quality in the 
Midwest – but most notably in the hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico – where two-thirds of the 
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nitrogen that makes up the hypoxic zone is estimated to originate from cultivated agriculture in 
the Mississippi River Basin (White et al. 2014).2 From the farmer’s perspective, winter cover 
crops are an attractive option for their in-field benefits, along with the fact that they do not take 
land out of cash-crop production. The in-field benefits from long-term use of cover crops include 
reduced soil loss (Kaspar, Radke, and Laflen 2001), increased soil organic matter (Moore et al. 
2014, Kaspar and Singer 2011), improved soil health (Snapp et al. 2005), and enhanced water-
storage capacity and infiltration (Basche et al. 2016). However, despite their considerable 
benefits to the cropping system, adoption of cover crops remains subdued in the Midwest. 
Satellite imagery suggests that cover crops were incorporated into corn and soybean rotations on 
only 2.65% of Iowa cropland in 2015 (Rundquist and Carlson 2017), while the Census of 
Agriculture found that the cover crop farmland share increased from 1% to 3%, between 2012 
and 2017 (NASS 2012-2017).  
A major barrier to cover crop adoption is the uncertainty associated with implementing 
new practices and their economic returns. Arbuckle and Roesch-McNally (2015) report that 
some farmers are concerned that cover crops could take water from the soil at the expense of the 
following cash crop and induce yield drags.3 Among Iowa farmers, Plastina et al. (2018b) found 
that the additional costs from planting and terminating cover crops amounted to around $40 per 
acre, often leading to short-term net losses even among farmers participating in cost-share 
                                                 
2 Kladivko et al. (2014) look at five Midwest states and estimate the area of land that is suitable for cover crop use. 
They conclude that if all tile-drained land in continuous corn or corn-soy rotations that is managed with no-till, 
spring till, or fall till–but could plausibly be converted to spring till used winter rye that was successfully established 
by overseeding–then there would be a 19% reduction in the nitrate loss transported to the Gulf of Mexico via the 
Mississippi River. 
3 Experimental results are mixed as to whether cover crops reduce the subsequent cash crop yield. Pantoja et al. 
(2015), in a study of no-till plots in Iowa, find that cereal rye reduced corn yields by 6%. However, in a meta-
analysis of winter cover crop studies in the United States and Canada, Marcillo and Miguez (2017) conclude that 
cover crops generally do not reduce subsequent corn yields; this is specifically true in the upper Midwest region. In 
Iowa, Martinez-Feria et al. (2016) do not find consistent corn yield declines following cover crops. Seifert, Azzari, 





programs. Finally, the large percentage of Iowa farmland that is leased (53%) as opposed to 
owner-operated (37%)4–along with the fact that only one-third of those landowners would be 
willing to help their tenant pay for cover crop planting costs (Zhang, Plastina, and Sawadgo 
2018)–are factors that tend to inhibit cover crop adoption.5  
To promote the use of cover crops, several cost-share programs are available to Iowa 
farmers.6 An estimated 317,132 acres of cover crops were planted in Iowa in the fall of 2015 
with $8.4 million in financial assistance from government-sponsored cost-share programs (Iowa 
Nutrient Reduction Strategy 2016). Cost-sharing belongs to the class of Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES), which can be defined as a contract for a voluntary transaction in 
which a specific environmental service is provided by a land manager7 in exchange for a 
payment, given the fulfillment of the contract (Ferraro 2008). An important concept in the design 
of cost-share programs is additionality: the adoption of a practice that would not have occurred 
in the absence of the PES program. When additionality is low, farmers who receive cost-share 
largely do not require it to implement the conservation practice, limiting the program’s cost-
effectiveness. High additionality can be indicative of an effective program. The goal of this study 
is to assess the effectiveness of cost-share programs at increasing cover-crop acreage. To 
estimate the additionality of cover-crop cost-share programs in Iowa, we use a matching 
                                                 
4 Ten percent of Iowa farmland is in government programs (such as the Conservation Reserve Program) or custom 
farmed. 
5 Similarly, in other regions, Bergtold et al. (2012) find that tenants in Alabama are 20% less likely to adopt cover 
crops on rented land, and Singer (2008) finds that only 14% of Corn-Belt farmers would use cover crops on rented 
land. 
6 These programs include funding from the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship, the 
Environmental Quality Incentive Program, and the Conservation Stewardship Program. A detailed description of the 
cost-share programs available to farmers in 2015 is available in Appendix A. 
7 Land manager is defined in this study as the person who makes decisions on farming practices for a particular 
farm, irrespectively of the land ownership or tenure structure (i.e., irrespectively of whether the land manager is a 





estimator combining farm-level data from a cover crop survey that was linked to the 2012 
Census of Agriculture.  
Much of the prior literature regarding cost-share and the adoption of conservation 
practices examines the effect of cost-share payments as one of many determinants of 
conservation practice adoption (Prokopy et al. 2008). A handful of studies use stated preference 
methods to estimate farmers' willingness to adopt conservation practices (Cooper and Keim 
1996; Cooper 2003; Ma et al. 2012). A growing branch of the additionality literature makes use 
of observational micro-data to measure the success of PES programs. Claassen, Duquette, and 
Smith (2018) find that additionality rates differ among best-management practices such as 
nutrient management, conservation tillage, and buffer strips across the United States. They also 
find higher additionality for practices that take land out of crop production or have higher short-
term costs. Regarding cover crops specifically, Chabé-Ferret and Subervie (2013) estimate that 
PES programs in France increase cover crop acreage by 11 hectares per farm.8 In the United 
States, studies in Maryland (Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez 2011; Fleming 2017; Fleming, 
Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018) and Ohio (Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 2013) find 
that crop farmers’ enrollment in cost-share programs increases the share of acres under cover 
crops from 8% to 28%. Lastly, results from ongoing work by Gonzalez-Ramirez and Arbuckle 
(2016) indicate that that cost-share payments increase acreage share of cover crops by 18 
percentage points among Iowa farmers, and Lee et al. (2018) find that Iowa farmers who 
received cost-share or technical assistance were more than twice as likely to plant cover crops 
than those who did not.  
                                                 
8 The authors do not report the average area under cover crops, or the average farm size, so we cannot calculate 





This study makes three primary contributions to the existing literature. First, we use data 
from a unique cover crop survey that allows for partial-budget analysis to calculate how cover-
crop use affects farmers’ profit. Second, we provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation of 
private and public costs of abating nitrate leaching in Iowa through cover crops. While other 
studies (Fleming 2017; Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018) have looked at the public 
costs associated with cost-share programs, they do not consider the costs borne by the farmer. 
Lastly, while cover-crop cost-share additionality estimates exist for the Chesapeake Bay region 
(Fleming 2017; Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018) and Ohio River Basin (Mezzatesta, 
Newburn, and Woodward 2013), to our knowledge we provide the first set of final estimates for 
the Upper Mississippi River Basin. Agriculture in the Upper Mississippi River Basin alone is 
estimated to be responsible for 43% of nitrogen and 27% of phosphorus loadings delivered to the 
Gulf hypoxic zone (Aulenbach et al. 2007), thus reducing nutrient loss in this region could have 
significant global impacts.  
We find that cost-share programs do incentivize the use of cover crops in Iowa. Cost-
share recipients plant additional cover-crop acreage equivalent to 15% of their farmland that 
would not have been planted without cost-share payment. The estimated additionality rate is 
54%, suggesting that almost half of cost-share dollars subsidize acreage that would have been 
planted to cover crops even in the absence of the cost-share programs. The combined farmer and 
public cost of avoiding one pound of nitrogen loss from Iowa fields by using cover crops is 
estimated at $1.59 to $4.33, and farmers absorb about 70% of those costs as private losses after 
accounting for cost-share payments that offset the remaining 30%. Furthermore, we estimate the 
public cost to abate nitrogen loads in Iowa waterways via cover crops beyond what would have 





comparison of our estimates against similar programs in Maryland suggests that cost-share 
payments in Iowa are more cost-effective than in Maryland.  
Methodology 
In an ideal research experiment, we would randomly offer farmers cost-share payments 
of various amounts to plant cover crops on their land. Our control group would include the 
farmers who are not offered cost-share. We could then determine the effect of cost-share on 
cover crop acreage by comparing the average cover crop use of farmers who received each level 
of cost-share to that of the control group. Due to random assignment, we would not need to 
worry about selection bias affecting our results. However, such an experiment is not feasible. In 
reality, selection bias is an issue because each farmer decides whether to plant cover crops and 
whether to apply for cost-share. To address this issue, we use farmers’ observable characteristics 
and a matching estimator to create a counterfactual for the farmers who received cost-share. We 
then compare the average cover crop use for cost-share recipients to the group of counterfactuals 
to estimate the effect of cost-share on cover crop use. 
Several methods have been used to correct for selection bias in analyses measuring 
additionality of PES programs, including endogenous switching regressions (Lichtenberg and 
Smith-Ramirez 2011; Fleming 2017; Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018), propensity-
score matching (Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 2013; Gonzalez-Ramirez and Arbuckle 
2016; Claassen, Duquette, and Smith 2018), and difference-in-difference matching (Chabé-Ferret 
and Subervie 2013).  Advantages of difference-in-difference matching and endogenous 
switching regressions include that they account for unobservable factors. However, due to data 
restrictions, difference-in-difference matching is unfeasible in our dataset. We use a matching 
estimator to exploit the flexibility provided by its semi-parametric approach and use the 






Following Rubin (1974), we let the treatment, iT , be an indicator variable for whether 
farmer i  received a cost-share payment for cover crops during a given year. Our outcome 
variable of interest, denoted iY , is the total proportion of farm acreage under cover crops that 
year. Let ( )i iY T  represent the potential outcomes: (0)iY  is the outcome when the individual does 
not receive cost-share, and (1)iY  is the outcome when s/he does. Since we never observe both 
outcomes for any individual (Rubin 1974), we cannot calculate the treatment effect,  - (1) (0)i iY Y , 
and instead must rely on an estimated counterfactual.  
It is plausible that farmer i who currently receives cost-share payments is intrinsically 
more willing to plant cover crops than farmer j who does not receive cost-share, even in the 
absence of cost-share programs, such that 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗(0)|𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 = 0 < 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0)|𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1. If we simply attributed 
the entire difference between the averages across groups of farmers (i.e., ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0) 𝑁𝑁⁄𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  versus 
∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗(1) 𝑀𝑀⁄𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 ) to the effect of cost-share payments, we would be overestimating the effect of cost-
share on our outcome variables of interest. 
Instead, we use farmer i ’s observable characteristics, iX  to obtain the counterfactual 
outcomes we do not observe. However, matching on a large number of observable variables 
presents the difficulty known as the curse of dimensionality (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). One 
way to reduce the number of dimensions is to use the propensity score, a scalar. In our 
application, the propensity score, ( )ip X , is defined as the probability that a farmer received a 
cost-share payment, given his/her pre-treatment characteristics: 





Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that conditioning on the propensity score is 
equivalent to conditioning on the set of covariates, under two assumptions. First, the 
unconfoundedness assumption requires that the potential outcome be independent of whether the 
individual is treated, conditional on the propensity score. Formally, 
    {𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0),𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(1)} ⊥ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 | 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖.        (2.2)          
Second, the overlap assumption ensures common support between the treatment and 
control groups: 
    0 < 𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) < 1 ∀ 𝑖𝑖.         (2.3)           
If these two assumptions hold, we can use the matching estimator to calculate the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which measures the effect that receiving cost-share had on 
adoption, among those who received cost-share: 
   𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(1) − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0)|𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1].         (2.4) 
The identifying assumption is that after conditioning on the propensity score, farmers 
receiving cost-share and farmers not receiving cost-share will have the same willingness to use 
cover crops. That is, we are able to control for all factors that impact both the farmer receiving 
cost-share and planting cover crops. Because we use Agricultural Census data, we have a large 
set of variables relating to many aspects of the farming operation, which makes the identifying 
assumption plausible. However, unobservable factors that could violate this assumption include 
farmers’ environmental perceptions, network effects, and attitudes towards land stewardship. 
Although we cannot directly test whether unobservable variables are confounding our results, we 
conduct a sensitivity analysis to provide evidence that it is highly unlikely that hidden bias is the 





Additionally, it is assumed that the treatment does not affect the outcomes among non-
treated individuals. That is, an individual receiving cost-share cannot affect the cover crop 
planting behavior of farmers who did not receive cost-share.9 
Empirical Analysis 
First, we estimate the propensity score as a function of pre-treatment farmer and farm 
characteristics using a logistic regression: 
    𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1) =
1
1+𝑒𝑒−𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋
,                     (2.5) 
where 𝛽𝛽 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. We use matching with replacement to 
improve the quality of matches, meaning each control can be a match for more than one treated 
observation. To ensure sufficient quality of matches, we add a caliper to only consider matches 
within a specified radius, c, such that ( ) ( ) |i jp X p X c− ≤| . The choice of the caliper value 
requires consideration of the trade-off between bias and efficiency (Cochran and Rubin 1973; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). A smaller caliper reduces bias by requiring better matches, and 
therefore eliminating treated observations with too few controls, at the expense of efficiency. A 
larger caliper increases the number of matches and the additional information increases 
efficiency, but at the expense of lower matching quality and potentially higher bias. The distance 
between observations is defined as: 
  𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = �
𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) − 𝑝𝑝�𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) − 𝑝𝑝�𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗��  ≤ 𝑐𝑐
∞ �𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) − 𝑝𝑝�𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗�� > 𝑐𝑐
�.       (2.6)                
. 
                                                 
9 This assumption would not hold if cost-share payments lead to higher cover crop seed costs for all farmers, 
discouraging adoption among the non-treated; or if the use of cover crops by a community leader who receives cost-
share payments incentivizes neighboring farmers to adopt cover crops. Although the assumption might not be 
completely valid at the township level (among neighboring farms), we argue that this assumption is not violated at 
the state level when only 3% of Iowa farmland is planted to cover crops. Furthermore, we are not aware of a more 





We match each treated individual to the m individuals in the control group with the 
closest propensity scores, obtaining the counterfactuals: 
     𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(0) =
1
𝑚𝑚
∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 ,                               (2.7)  
where 𝐽𝐽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  is the set of controls to treatment observation i with the m-lowest values of 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. As 
noted by Ho et al. (2007), matching on the true propensity score asymptotically balances the 
covariates between the treatment and control groups. We assess the correctness of our estimated 
propensity score by evaluating the post-matching balance between the two groups. We conduct a 
sample balance assessment of the covariates between the treated and control groups, using the 
standardized mean difference (𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). The 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 is the difference 
in covariate means across the treated (𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇) and the control group (𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶), divided by the average 
standard deviation (s) across the two groups: 





.         (2.8) 
The matched sample is deemed superior to the unmatched sample if the post-matching 
𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷s are generally smaller in absolute value that the pre-matching 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷s. The evaluation 
process is repeated after varying the values of c and m until an adequately balanced sample is 
obtained. Once matching is complete, we estimate the treatment effect as follows:     
   𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 1
𝑁𝑁
∑ �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(1) − 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(0)�𝑖𝑖∈�𝑖𝑖�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1�         (2.9) 
The standard errors are computed following Abadie and Imbens (2006), taking into 
account that the propensity score is estimated. The estimation and robustness checks are 







We evaluate the sensitivity of the results to matching specification by comparing the 
results from the selected model against those from 3 additional matching techniques totaling 30 
additional models: (1) 13 nearest-neighbor models with alternative numbers of neighbors (1 
through 8) and caliper sizes (0.05 to 0.20), (2) 10 propensity-score kernel-matching models with 
differing kernel types and bandwidths, and (3) 7 direct-matching models based on covariates 
with varying numbers of neighbors (1 through 7). Kernel matching, while still using the 
propensity score, differs from nearest-neighbor matching by matching each treated observation 
to a weighted average of all available controls, determined using a kernel estimator. We use 
Epanechnikov and Gaussian kernel types, with bandwidths ranging from 0.01 to 0.2 (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig 2008).10 Direct matching is based on the Euclidian distance between covariates 
instead of on a propensity score. 
Next, we evaluate how prone our results are to hidden bias by constructing Rosenbaum 
bounds, following Diprete and Gangl (2004). The Rosenbaum-bounds method determines 
whether the estimated ATT would remain significant under the existence of an unobserved factor 
causing a difference in the odds of cost-share program participation status. Two matched 
observations with identical observable characteristics but different unobservable characteristics 
that drive treatment assignment would differ in terms of probability of being treated, presenting a 
violation of the unconfoundedness assumption. In this study, we are most concerned about 
positive hidden bias, i.e. unobservable factors associated with higher cover-crop use that increase 
the likelihood of receiving cost-share and result in an upwardly biased ATT estimate.  
                                                 





To implement the Rosenbaum-bounds procedure, we artificially introduce an unobserved 
factor that causes a difference in treatment assignment, denoted Γ. Rosenbaum (2002) shows that 
the odds ratio of two observations with identical observable variables is bounded such that  
    1
𝛤𝛤
≤ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 ≤ 𝛤𝛤.       (2.10) 
If Γ = 1, then there is no hidden bias, while values of Γ greater than one imply an 
unobserved bias. For example, Γ = 2 implies a hidden bias that could at most double the odds of 
treatment within matched pairs. The non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test gives the bounds 
of the test, which tests the null hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero. Again, since we are 
concerned about positive selection, we focus on the lower bound of the test and compute the test 
statistic for various values of Γ and the test’s p-value (denoted p+), with higher values of Γ 
lowering the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis.  
Partial Budget Analysis 
The goal of the partial-budget analysis is to estimate changes in farmers’ profits due to 
cover crops. We use the partial budget template developed by Plastina et al. (2018a; 2018b) to 
calculate the net returns to cover crops for each farmer in our sample. Only farms that had a field 
with cover crops and a field without cover crops, followed by the same subsequent cash crop in 
2016 were included in the partial budget analysis. We calculate net returns by comparing each 
farm’s field with cover crops to its field without cover crops, accounting for differences in 
revenues, cover-crop planting costs, cover-crop termination costs, and other costs:  
 Net Returns = Differential Revenue – Cover Crop Planting Cost –     (2.11) 
  Cover Crop Termination Cost – Other Differential Costs. 
Differences in revenues can be the result of differential (positive or negative) cash crop 





payment received (if any) for planting the cover crop. Cover crop planting costs include the cost 
of seeds as well as fixed and variable costs of planting with owned machinery, hired machinery 
or custom work. Termination costs were null for cover crops terminated with winter kill, and 
only included the additional costs on top of typical practices applied by each farmer to all of 
his/her farms if cover crops were terminated with herbicides or mechanically. For example, if a 
farmer applied a pre-plant burn down to all his/her acres in the spring, only the additional cost (if 
any) associated with a more concentrated, higher volume, or more expensive herbicide solution, 
plus the additional machinery cost for any extra spraying passes were counted as termination 
costs.  For farmers who terminated cover crops by mowing or tillage, only machinery and 
material costs additional to what was typically used on their non-cover cropped acres were 
counted as termination costs. Lastly, other differential costs include changes in fertilizer 
application and other input use. We use the median value for the net return in our policy 
calculations to avoid undue influence of outliers. 
Data 
The data were collected through a hard-copy survey of Iowa farm operators, which was 
administered by the Upper Midwest regional office of the National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) in 2017. The survey sample of 1,250 operators was determined using randomized cluster 
sampling by crop reporting district and farm size. Row crop farming rotations in this study were 
limited to corn, soybeans, and wheat. The survey was first mailed on February 1, 2017, and a 
second questionnaire was sent to non-respondents in mid-February 2017. Finally, those who did 
not respond were contacted by telephone. The survey asked detailed questions on agricultural 
practices relating to the planting and termination of cover crops, farmers’ experience with cover 





The sample was selected based on prior cover crop acreage, which allows for a larger 
sample of cover crop users than in most past studies. However, this introduces a sampling bias, 
which reduces the external validity of our results. For instance, while Iowa was estimated to have 
cover crops on just 3% of farmland (NASS 2017), the farmers in our sample planted cover crops 
on 11.7% of their acres, on average. Because relatively few non-adopters were included in the 
sample, our estimated  𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(0) might be upward biased if the excluded non-adopters were better 
matches than those included in our sample, which would imply a downward bias in our estimated 
ATT. Thus, relative to the statewide population of farmers, our ATT estimate should be 
considered a conservative lower bound. Although our sample is not representative of farmers in 
the state, it represents cover crop adopters, which are the group of interest in this analysis.11  
After removing observations for which farmers did not state whether they received cost-
share, did not specify how many acres had cover crops, or did not provide information for all 
2012 Census variables that we use as covariates, our sample is composed of 407 observations for 
the matching analysis. Despite dropping 267 observations from the original sample, the sample 
composition remains similar, with only a small change in the proportion of the sample receiving 
cost-share and average acreage share in cover crops.12 Thus, we are not concerned that removing 
these observations imposes any additional bias on our sample. 
The present study focuses on farmers’ cover crop decisions for the fall of 2015. Our 
variables of interest are whether the farmer received a cost-share payment to plant cover crops in 
2015, the per-acre payment received,13 total acreage planted to the most widely used cover crop 
                                                 
11 The cost of sampling a larger population of farms and securing responses for a high number of cover crop 
adopters with a 97:3 ratio of non-adopters to adopters was prohibitive. 
12 In the full sample of 674 observations, 21% of farmers received cost-share, and farmers planted cover crops on 
12.7% of their land in 2015. Among the 407 observations used in the matching analysis, 22% of farmers received 
cost-share, and farmers planted cover crops on 12.1% of their land in 2015. 
13 The cost-share source and contract length are not specified. Respondents report different payment rates, 





mix, and farm size. In table 2.1, we report a summary of the make-up of the 407 observations 
used in the matching analysis. The sample is composed of about the same number of cover crop 
users and non-users in 2015 (208 vs. 199, respectively). About 40% of cover crop users received 
cost-share payments. Among this group, the average number of cover crop acres and the 
proportion of total farmland under cover crops are higher than the corresponding averages 
among farmers who did not receive cost-share payments. 
Survey respondents answered detailed questions about their cover crop planting and 
termination methods, and how their subsequent cash-crop costs and revenues differed between 
fields with and without cover crops. We have enough information to calculate net returns to 
cover crops for 41 farms that received cost-share and 30 farms that did not. This is lower than 
our total sample size because some respondents did not include adequate information on 
machinery use or input uses on either their cover-cropped or non-cover-cropped fields. The 
median net losses per acre from cover crop use among farmers that received cost-share payments 
and among farmers who did not receive cost-share payments were, respectively, $23 and $40.  
Furthermore, the average cost-share payment received by farmers in our sample amounted to $26 
per acre planted to cover crops. 
Each response to our survey was linked by an anonymized identification code to the 
operator’s data from the 2012 Census of Agriculture, giving us a large set of covariates. The 
Census variables are all pre-treatment, which is fundamental to our ability to use propensity-
score analysis. We include variables regarding farm characteristics, operator characteristics, and 
operator's experience with conservation, selected based on the existing literature (Chabé-Ferret 
and Subervie 2013; Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 2013; Gonzalez-Ramírez and 





in the 2012 Census of Agriculture, as detailed in Table 2.2. Variables relating to farm 
characteristics include total acres operated in 2012 (Farm Size), total acres rented or leased from 
others (Rented Acres), gross farm sales (Farm Sales), presence of livestock (Livestock), presence 
of poultry (Poultry), corn acreage (Corn), soybean acreage (Soy), acres drained by tile (Tile 
Drainage), and acres drained by ditch (Ditch Drainage). Following Imbens (2015), and under 
the assumption that cover-crop use tends to be correlated over time, we include cover crop 
acreage in 2012 (Cover Crops) as a covariate. For farmer characteristics, we use age of the 
principal operator (Age), years since the operator first operated a farm (Experience), number of 
days the operator worked off the farm (Off-Farm Labor), percentage of the farmer's household 
income that comes from farming (Farm Income), and USDA crop-reporting districts as regional 
indicators. Recipients of cost-share payments in 2015, on average, operated more acres, had 
higher gross farm sales, had livestock less frequently, harvested more acres of soybeans, and 
planted more cover crops in 2012 than farmers who did not receive cost-share payments in 2015. 
Other variables are not statistically significantly different between the treated and non-treated 
group. 
Results 
Additionality of Cost-Share Programs 
Results of the propensity score equation estimated according to equation (2.5) are 
reported in Table 2.3. As expected, past cover crop acreage increases the probability of receiving 
cost-share, since farmers who are more familiar with conservation practices may better 
understand the nuances of the conservation programs. Farm size also increases the propensity 
score, suggesting larger farms may have more expertise dealing with government programs and 
may be more willing to experiment with cover crops than smaller farms. Age increases the 





literature (Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 2013; Gonzalez-Ramírez and Arbuckle 2016), 
which found that older farmers are less likely to receive cost-share. In addition, having livestock 
on the farm decreases the propensity score. Other variables are not significantly different from 
zero at a 95% confidence level.  
Given the estimated propensity scores, we create our matched sample. We vary the 
number of controls matched to each treated observation and the presence and size of the caliper 
in constructing the sample. The specifications are evaluated based on the balance of the 
covariates between the cost-share recipients and non-recipients. That is, we choose the 
specification that performs best at removing bias through the matching procedure (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2008). In our preferred specification, we match each cost-share recipient with seven 
controls (neighbors) and use a caliper of 0.15. After discarding six observations from the original 
set of treated farms due to caliper choice, the sample balance across the remaining 400 farms (85 
treated and 315 untreated) is analyzed in Table 2.4. After matching, all the 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷s are 11% or 
less, which is well below the 20% threshold that Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) deem to be a 
large bias. This suggests that matching corrected much of the difference in the observable 
characteristics between cost-share recipients and non-recipients (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). 
Applying equation (2.9) to the selected specification (model 1 in Table 2.5a), we find that 
receiving cost-share payments increases acreage in cover crops, on average, by 15 percentage 
points, a difference that is significant at a 95% confidence level. We estimate that the 85 farmers 
who received cost-share payments would have planted cover crops on 12% of their acres in the 
absence of cost-share, whereas they actually planted cover crops on 27% of their acres. 
Following Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward (2013) and Fleming, Lichtenberg, and 





cost-share acreage would have been planted to cover crops in the absence of the cost-share 
programs.  
We find that our measure of the impact of cover crop cost-share programs in Iowa is 
slightly lower than that reported in most previous studies: 15% versus 20% to 30% (Mezzatesta, 
Newburn, and Woodward 2013; Gonzalez-Ramírez and Arbuckle 2016; Fleming 2017; Fleming, 
Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018). Prior studies find additionality rates for cover crop cost-share 
programs in Maryland (Fleming 2017; Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018) and Ohio 
(Mezzatesta, Newburn, and Woodward 2013) ranging from 83% to 98%, suggesting that 
relatively few of those acres would have been planted to cover crops in the absence of cost-share. 
We postulate that these values are higher than our additionality rate of 54% due to the 
composition of our sample and differences in payment rates across states. While other studies 
rely on samples representative of their state’s farmers, cover-crop users are over-represented in 
our sample. If our sample had more non-adopters, some of these observations could be better 
matches for the cost-share recipients and hence join the control group, decreasing the value of 
Y(0). This would, in turn, increase the estimated ATT and the additionality rate. Furthermore, 
while average cost-share payments in Maryland amount to $45 per acre, they amount to $26 per 
acre in our sample. The higher payment rate may attract more farmers who would be unlikely to 
use cover crops without payment.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 2.5b summarizes the results from alternative matching specifications and provides 
a robustness check to the results from our selected model. Reducing the size of the caliper to 
ensure higher quality matches and changing the numbers of controls in the propensity-score 
nearest-neighbor models 2 through 13 do not substantially affect the results. In our selected 





drives both participation in the cost-share program and past cover crop use, conditioning on past 
cover crop acreage will confound our results. Model 14 is specified with the same number of 
neighbors and caliper size as the selected model but omits 2012 cover crop use as an explanatory 
variable. The ATT estimate for model 14 is 19%, which lies within the 95% confidence interval 
of model 1.  
Overall, the results from the 31 model specifications are similar, with the estimated 
increase in cover crop acreage share due to cost-share payments ranging from 13 to 19 
percentage points. We therefore argue that our results are not sensitive to model specification. 
We further evaluate our results by assessing the selection on observables assumption. 
Although we cannot directly test this assumption on our preferred model because the Rosenbaum 
bounds procedure (Diprete and Gangl 2004) is only applicable to one-to-one nearest-neighbor 
matching without replacement, we apply it to model 6 with an ATT of 16%. The p+ values for 
various levels of Γ and are reported in table 2.6. Higher values of Γ lower the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no treatment effect. We reject the null hypothesis up to Γ = 74, 
suggesting that an unobserved factor increasing the odds of being treated by 7300% would not be 
sufficient to make the estimated ATT result insignificant, at a 95% confidence level. Therefore, 
we argue that our results are robust to hidden bias.  
Cost-effectiveness of Cost-share Programs 
To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of cover crop cost-share programs, we focus on nitrate 
pollution reduction. In reality, cover crops have additional environmental benefits from reduced 
soil erosion and phosphorous loss, but nitrate commands the most attention. We use literature-
derived estimates for the per-acre nitrogen loss reduction due to cover crops, combined with the 
programs’ expenditures to calculate private and public costs of abating nitrate leaching in Iowa 





Columns 1 through 3 of Table 2.7 divide Iowa cover crop farmland into (1) cover crop 
acreage for which the farmer received cost-share, (2) cover crop acreage for which the farmer did 
not receive cost-share, and (3) all cover crop acreage. In 2015, farmers in Iowa planted an 
estimated 591,880 acres to cover crops, of which 317,132 acres were funded with cost-share, as 
is displayed in table 2.7a (Rundquist and Carlson 2017). Our partial-budget analysis suggests 
that cost-share recipients and non-recipients face per-acre net losses of $23 and $40, 
respectively, after accounting for cost-share payments (table 2.7b). Applying these figures to the 
317,132 cover-crop acres funded with cost-share and the estimated 274,748 acres planted 
without cost-share, the aggregate estimate of farmers’ net losses due to cover crops amounts to 
$18.28 million (table 2.7c). The Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy (2016) reports that $8.4 
million were publicly spent on cover crop cost-share.14 A study in Boone, central Iowa, found 
that cover crops reduced nitrogen loss by 10.4 to 28.4 pounds per acre per year (Malone et al. 
2014). The estimated nitrogen load reduction to Iowa waterways from cover crop use in 2015 
amounts to 3,078 to 8,405 tons (table 2.7d), calculated as 10.4 to 28.4 pounds of nitrogen per 
acre (Malone et al. 2014) divided by 2,000, and multiplied by total estimated acres in cover crops 
(table 2.7a). Thus, the combined farmer and public cost to abate nitrogen through cover crops is 
estimated at $1.59 to $4.33 per pound of nitrogen, with farmers undertaking $1.09 to $2.97 per 
pound in net losses (table 2.7e).  
However, since we are mainly interested in the cost-effectiveness of the cost-share 
programs, we focus on the additionality effects of this program. Applying the 54% additionality 
rate from model 1 to the estimated cover cropped area with cost-share (column 1 of table 2.7a), 
                                                 
14 Alternatively, the aggregate cost-share estimate in table 7c could be obtained by multiplying the average cost-
share payment in our sample ($26) by the estimated area in cover crops (317,132 acres) to arrive at $8.2 million. The 
public cost of abating nitrogen through cover crop cost-share programs in Iowa is therefore estimated at $1.69 to 





we estimate that 171,927 cover-crop acres were additional in Iowa (column 4 of table 2.7a). The 
public cost of abating nitrogen through cover crop cost-share programs in Iowa is estimated at 
$1.72 to $4.70 per pound, which is lower than the reported costs in Maryland, ranging from 
$5.80 to $8.87 per pound (Fleming 2017; Fleming, Lichtenberg, and Newburn 2018). Again, the 
differences in cost effectiveness are likely driven by the higher payment rate in Maryland.15 Our 
estimates for Iowa also compare favorably to the nitrogen abatement costs in the Gulf of Mexico 
from the Lower and Upper Mississippi River Basins reported by Marshall et al. (2018), 
amounting to $5.29 and $23.40 per pound of nitrogen, respectively.16 The major difference 
between these estimates and our estimate stems from the fact that Marshall et al. (2018) measure 
the nitrogen load delivered to Gulf of Mexico, and proximity plays a critical role in their 
calculation as nitrogen is deposited into river banks en route to the Gulf of Mexico. Thus, using 
their framework, reducing pollution to the Gulf of Mexico only through cover crops in Iowa 
would be costly, due to the large distance between the two regions. Finally, our results are in line 
with the equilibrium price of $3.13 per pound of nitrogen estimated by Ribaudo, Savage, and 
Aillery (2014) in an analysis of a water-quality trading scheme among Chesapeake Bay area 
farmers. 
Conclusion 
In this study, we analyze the effect of cost-share program participation on cover crop 
adoption. We first use farms’ and farmers’ characteristics from the 2012 Census of Agriculture 
in combination with 2017 survey data from Iowa to calculate the probability a farmer receives 
cost-share in 2015 (i.e., the propensity score). Second, we match the observations for cost-share 
                                                 
15 Unfortunately, the nitrogen load reductions are not reported by Fleming (2017) or Fleming, Lichtenberg, and 
Newburn (2018). 
16 The cost estimates in Marshall et al. (2018) include capital costs, annual implementation costs, and the value of 





recipients with similar non-cost-share recipients based on the propensity scores. Then, we 
estimate the effect of receiving cost-share on the share of farmland in cover crops across the 
matched observations.  
We find that participation in cost-share programs increases the users’ share of cover-
cropped farmland by an average of 15%, implying an additionality rate of 54%. This suggests 
that cost-share programs do encourage adoption of cover crops that is additional to that which 
would occur in their absence, but almost half of the cover-cropped farmland would have had 
cover crops in the absence of program payments. Despite the relatively low additionality rate, the 
public cost of abating nitrogen pollution in Iowa waterways through cover crop cost-share is 
relatively low at $1.72 to $4.70 per pound. This cost is likely lower than in other states because 
cover crop cost-share payment rates are lower in Iowa (Bowman and Lynch 2019). Furthermore, 
we estimate that farmers absorb about 70% of total cover crop costs, and public monies finance 
the remaining 30%.  
One limitation of our study is that the sampling strategy does not allow for statistically 
representative statewide inferences (see footnote 12). Another limitation is that we do not 
consider slippage, while agricultural payment programs can induce farmers to plant crops on 
marginal land (Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez 2011; Fleming 2017; Fleming, Lichtenberg, and 
Newburn 2018). However, we are not concerned about slippage in our setting, because even with 
cost-share, cover crops are still unprofitable for most farmers, short-term. Finally, this study does 
not venture into farmers' non-economic motives for planting cover crops (Arbuckle and Roesch-
McNally 2015; Lee et al. 2018). Since there is evidence that farmers adopt cover crops without 
government support, even at a short-term profit loss (Plastina et al. 2018a, 2018b), future 





cover crops, while also encouraging new adoption. Analyses on how cost-share affects those 
who have never planted cover crops should also be of interest to policymakers. 
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Table 2.1     Sample description. 
  
Farmers who planted cover crops in 2015 
Farmers who did not 









in cover crops 
Frequency 
Received cost-share 
payment in 2015 91 244 0.276 – 
Did not receive cost-





Table 2.2     Summary statistics from the 2012 U.S. Census of Agriculture, by participation in cost-share programs in 2015. 
Variable Variable description Census Mean 
Significant 
difference Name  K-Code 
Cost-share 
(n = 91) 
No cost-share 
(n = 316) 
Farm Size Total acres operated K46 948.0 766.6 * 
Rented Acres Acres rented or leased from others K44 562.1 430.4  
Farm Sales Gross farm sales (in thousands of dollars) TVP 1046.6 689.7 *** 
Livestock 
Presence of cattle; hogs and pigs; equine; sheep and 
goats; or other livestock on the operation (1 if present) 
K1201, K1211, 
K1247, K1239 
0.63 0.75 ** 
Poultry Presence of poultry on the operation (1 if present) K1217 0.09 0.06  
Corn  Corn acreage harvested for grain K67 400.1 326.1  
Soy  Soybean acreage harvested for grain K88 299.7 229.7 * 
Cover crops Acres planted to cover crops K3456 163.0 73.3 *** 
Tile Drainage Acres drained by tile K3450 424.7 364.0  
Ditch Drainage Acres drained by ditch K3451 45.5 37.7  
Age Age of the principal operator (years) K925 56.4 57.4  
Experience 
Number of years since the principal operator began to 
operate on any farm 
K1834 32.6 32.3  
Off-Farm 
Labor 
Number of days worked off the farm K929 1.92 2.05  
Farm Income 
Percent of the principal operator's total household 
income from the operation 
K1578 67.0 68.5  
*Denotes significance at 0.10 level 
**Denotes significance at 0.05 level 





Table 2.3     Propensity score regression results. 
Variable Coefficient   
Log Farm Size 0.9104 *** 
Rented Acres 1.080x10-6  
Farm Sales 3.32x10-7 * 
Livestock -0.8451 *** 
Poultry 0.4949  
Corn  -0.0015 * 
Soy  0.0001  
Cover crops 0.0030 *** 
Tile Drainage -0.0005  
Ditch Drainage -0.0004  
Age 0.3283 ** 
Age Squared -0.0031 ** 
Experience 0.0108  
Experience Squared 2.92x10-5  
Off-Farm Labor -0.0448  
Farm Income -0.0109 ** 
North West -0.3727  
North Central -1.1971  
North East -0.5827  
West Central -0.0956  
Central  -0.5172  
East Central -0.2322  
South West -0.7243  
South Central -1.7174 ** 
*Denotes significance at 0.10 level 
**Denotes significance at 0.05 level 
***Denotes significance at 0.01 level 
 
Note: All variables in table from 2012 Census of Agriculture 
 












Table 2.4     Sample balance assessment for selected specification, with seven neighbors and 
c=0.15 (N=400). 
Variable Standardized mean difference Before matching After matching 
Log Farm Size 0.406 0.015 
Rented Acres 0.172 0.024 
Farm Sales 0.249 0.007 
Livestock -0.272 -0.003 
Poultry 0.041 0.069 
Corn  0.140 0.024 
Soy  0.231 0.019 
Cover crops 0.466 -0.015 
Tile Drainage 0.055 0.030 
Ditch Drainage 0.016 0.074 
Age -0.104 0.054 
Experience 0.024 0.039 
Off-Farm Labor -0.093 0.013 
Farm Income -0.014 -0.110 
North West 0.154 0.009 
North Central -0.143 0.038 
North East -0.108 -0.074 
West Central 0.046 0.020 
Central  -0.085 0.000 
East Central 0.057 0.055 
South West -0.067 0.048 







Table 2.5     Average treatment effect on the treated results. 
(a) Results from selected specification  
 Y(0) Y(1) ATT SE 95% Confidence Interval Model  
Farmland share 
under cover crops 0.1228 0.2682 0.1454 0.0273 [0.0918, 0.1989] 1 
(b) Results from all specifications  





7 0.2 0.1562 0.0331 2 
7 0.1 0.1582 0.0356 3 
7 0.05 0.1309 0.0298 4 
7 0.02 0.1257 0.0377 5 
1 No 0.1568 0.0409 6 
2 No 0.1245 0.0426 7 
3 No 0.1509 0.0386 8 
4 No 0.1534 0.0379 9 
5 No 0.1549 0.0409 10 
6 No 0.1475 0.0415 11 
7 No 0.1536 0.0412 12 
8 No 0.1506 0.0408 13 





Kernel type Bandwidth ATT SE Model 
Epanechnikov 0.01 0.1574 0.0382 15 
Epanechnikov 0.04 0.1602 0.0357 16 
Epanechnikov 0.1 0.1567 0.0360 17 
Epanechnikov 0.15 0.1599 0.0357 18 
Epanechnikov 0.2 0.1688 0.0355 19 
Gaussian 0.01 0.1626 0.0372 20 
Gaussian 0.04 0.1574 0.0361 21 
Gaussian 0.1 0.1732 0.0354 22 
Gaussian 0.15 0.1873 0.0351 23 
Gaussian 0.2 0.1958 0.0351 24 
Euclidian 
distance* 
Neighbors  ATT SE Model  
1  0.1396 0.0372 25 
2  0.1647 0.0328 26 
3  0.1491 0.0345 27 
4  0.1466 0.0333 28 
5  0.1475 0.0332 29 
6  0.1516 0.0330 30 
7   0.1419 0.0334 31 
*Include bias adjustment and exact matching on livestock 
† Use population of 100 


























Table 2.7     Iowa cover crop acreage, expenditures, and marginal abatement cost of nitrogen 
(dollars per pound). 













cropped due to 
cost-share 
(a) Iowa farmland (acres) 
Estimated 
acres 317,132 274,748 591,880 171,927 
(b) Average private net loss from cover crop use (dollars per acre) 
Net loss per 
acre 23 40 31 23 
(c) Total estimated cost (million dollars) 
Cost-share  8.40 0.00 8.40 8.40 
Farmer  7.29 10.99 18.28 3.95 
Total  15.69 10.99 26.68 12.35 
(d) Estimated nitrogen load reduction (tons) 
Estimated N 
reduction 1,649 – 4,503  1,429 – 3,901 3,078 – 8,405 894 – 2,441 
(e) Marginal abatement cost of nitrogen (dollars per pound) 
Cost-share 0.93 – 2.55 0 0.50 – 1.36 1.72 – 4.70 
Farmer 0.81 – 2.21 1.41 – 3.85 1.09 – 2.97 0.81 – 2.21 








CHAPTER 3.    WHAT DRIVES LANDOWNERS’ CONSERVATION DECISIONS? 
EVIDENCE FROM IOWA 
Wendiam P.M. Sawadgo*, Wendong Zhang†, and Alejandro Plastina† 
Abstract 
Conservation practices such as no-till and cover crops have been shown to have on- and 
off-farm benefits. However, when benefits of a practice do not go to the provider, 
underinvestment may occur. Farmland rental arrangements where tenants may not reap the 
benefits of conservation investments are a commonly cited barrier to conservation practice 
adoption in agriculture and may result in lower adoption rates on rented land than on owner-
operated fields. This issue is especially important since more than half of Midwestern farmland 
is rented. This article examines factors driving adoption of four key conservation practices—no-
till, cover crops, buffer strips, and ponds/sediment basins—using a statistically representative 
survey of Iowa landowners. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that adoption is lower 
on rented land for cover crops, buffer strips, and sediment basins, but not for no-till. Our results 
also show that the large proportion of the state’s land owned by non-operating landowners and 
absentee landowners could present a barrier to increasing adoption of conservation practices. 
Furthermore, landowners seem open to increasing the use of cover crops in the immediate future 
and a sizable number are even willing to incentivize tenants by paying for part of the cover crop 
planting cost. Finally, almost half of landowners would be willing to increase the area of their 
land under conservation practices if they could receive conservation-related tax credits or 
deductions, in exchange, suggesting a potential policy strategy to increase adoption. 
                                                 
* PhD candidate, Department of Economics, Iowa State University 






Nutrient pollution from agriculture remains a major problem in Iowa and across the 
Midwest. The Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy (INRS) calls for vast increases in the use of 
various conservation practices to address nutrient loss into waterways and aims to reduce 
nitrogen and phosphorus loads from non-point sources by 41% and 29%, respectively (INRS 
2017). Funding for conservation programs has increased in recent decades, exceeding $27 billion 
from 2014 to 2018 (Pavelis et al. 2011; 113th Congress 2014), and the USDA Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) allocated almost $30 million to fund conservation practices 
in Iowa in the 2018 fiscal year alone. However, in 2016, 58% of rivers and streams and 57% of 
lakes and reservoirs across Iowa had a water quality impairment (IDNR 2017).  
A key obstacle is that about half of farmland in the Midwest is rented through short-term 
leases, which may make tenants less willing to invest in conservation practices with long-term 
benefits. This is a growing concern—in 2017, just 37% of Iowa farmland was owner-operated, a 
13 percentage-point decline from 1982 (Zhang et al. 2018).1 Additionally, a growing share of 
farmland belongs to non-operating landowners (NOLs)—landowners who do not currently 
farm—magnifying the knowledge gap about benefits and the importance of critical conservation 
practices. From 1982 to 2017, the percentage of Iowa farmland owned by full-time Iowa 
residents declined from 94% to 80%, which may further hinder conservation practices.  
Prior literature looks at a variety of factors affecting farmers’ adoption of conservation 
practices. Prokopy et al. (2008) group variables related to capacity, farm characteristics, farmers’ 
attitudes and environmental awareness, and their impact on adoption, and find that education, 
income, and total acreage most frequently impact adoption positively. Some studies conclude 
                                                 
1 These values exclude land enrolled in government programs and custom acres from total farmland. This is why it 





that land tenure insecurity negatively affects the adoption of conservation practices, such as 
cover crops (Bergtold et al. 2012; Deaton et al. 2018), perennial crops (Fraser 2004), and straw 
retention (Gao et al. 2018). However, some other studies find that tenants are more likely than 
owners to use conservation tillage (Varble et al. 2016; Lee and Stewart 1983; Neill and Lee 
2001). Soule et al. (2000) suggest that lease type matters—cash renters adopt conservation tillage 
less than owner-operators and crop-share renters.  
Few studies, however, consider the landowner perspective. One exception is Abdulla 
(2009), who uses a non-representative survey of Iowa landowners and finds that owners 
operating their own land does not affect conservation tillage adoption but does have an 
unexpected negative effect on structural conservation practice adoption (e.g., terraces). Other 
landowner studies largely focus on adoption of conservation practices (Constance et al. 1996; 
Perry-Hill and Prokopy 2014; Petrzelka and Marquart-Pyatt 2011; Ulrich-Schad et al. 2016) or 
enrollment in conservation programs (Petrzelka et al. 2012; Perry-Hill and Prokopy 2014) by 
absentee landowners and/or NOLs. These studies mostly do not compare how adoption rates 
differ between NOLs and operator landowners; however, a few studies identify barriers for 
tenants to adopt conservation practices on land owned by NOLs, including the timing and short 
nature of leasing arrangements, high rental rates, rental market competition, and a lack of 
communication between landowner and tenant (Carolan 2005; Ranjan et al. 2019).  
The purpose of our article is to determine how absentee landownership, land 
characteristics, and landowner demographics affect current conservation practice use in Iowa. 
We statistically evaluate three hypotheses: (1) conservation practices are used less on rented land 
compared to owner-operated land; (2) operator landowners have conservation practices on 





conservation practice use and their impact varies by practice. To evaluate our hypotheses, we use 
data from the 2017 Iowa Farmland Ownership and Tenure Survey (IFOTS) (Zhang et al. 2018), 
which is statistically representative of all farmland and landowners in Iowa as of July 1, 2017. 
Unlike producer surveys that often overestimate the use of conservation practices, IFOTS 
provides credible results that closely match adoption rates from the 2017 Census of Agriculture. 
IFOTS estimates suggest that no-till and cover crops are used on 27% and 4% of the state’s 
farmland, respectively, while census data finds that no-till and cover crops are on 27% and 3% of 
the state’s farmland, respectively (NASS 2017).  
We use a descriptive analysis and t-statistics to determine if adoption rates differ by 
landowner groups for no-till,2 cover crops, buffer strips, and ponds/sediment basins—four 
conservation practices highlighted by the INRS for their effectiveness at controlling soil loss 
and/or nutrient runoff (INRS 2017). We also discuss landowners’ stated reasons for not using 
conservation practices on their land and their plans to use them in the future. Lastly, we look at 
whether and how alternative conservation policies could spur the use of conservation practices 
and inquire about landowners’ willingness to encourage their tenants to plant cover crops.  
Materials and Methods 
The data used in this analysis come from the 2017 IFOTS, which is based on a random 
sample of 16.2 ha (40-ac) tracts of farmland that were chosen in 1988 following a two-stage area 
sampling design. The first stage assured a geographic dispersal of sample sections in each county 
in a systematic manner, and the second stage selected a single 16.2 ha (40-ac) unit at random 
within each sample section within each county. All landowners within this sample unit were then 
identified and became potential survey respondents. 
                                                 
2 No-till was defined as a tillage system in which crop residue is left on the soil and the soil is left undisturbed from 





Tract landowners were interviewed via telephone by the Iowa State University Center for 
Survey Statistics and Methodology between October 18, 2017 and February 2, 2018. The target 
population was owners of land used for agricultural purposes as of July 1, 2017. There were 535 
usable responses (68% response rate). An appendix to Zhang et al. (2018) includes the full 
questionnaire, details about the sampling design, and formulas for the landowner and land 
weights. These weights allow us to make inferences regarding the percent of owners as well as 
the percent of the farmland owned at the state and region level.3 For the purpose of this study, 
the state’s regions are defined by crop reporting districts (CRD) as used by US Department of 
Agriculture.4   
The IFOTS questionnaire asks landowners about land parcels they own, the ownership 
type, and leasing arrangements as of July 1, 2017. Respondents were asked how many acres were 
in no-till, how many acres had cover crops, and/or buffer strips, and/or a pond/sediment basin 
(henceforth a pond). Farmers using a specific practice indicated whether the land in question was 
operated by them, rented out, or both. Farmers not using that practice stated why not and whether 
they planned to in the future (in most stated preference studies, the magnitude of self-reported 
future adoption intentions can potentially be inflated). 
We aggregate responses to the CRD or state level using the farmland and landowner 
weights, and, for accuracy, focus on farmland with conservation practices that was entirely 
operated by the owner or entirely by a tenant.5 Thus, our estimates for the share of conservation 
                                                 
3 The expansion to number of owners is only possible when the specific question is based on demographics, not the 
farmland. 
4 The crop reporting districts and area of cropland in each district are as follows: Northwest (NW) 1,506,099 ha; 
West Central (WC) 1,549,044 ha; Southwest (SW) 926,673 ha; North Central (NC) 1,401,948 ha; Central (C) 
1,440,666 ha; South Central (SC) 699,316; Northeast (NE) 1,255,884 ha; East Central (EC) 1,127,978 ha; and 
Southeast (SE) 835,170 ha. 
5 Adoption that occurs on land that cannot be easily classified as owner-operated or rented out is limited. Our 





practices on rented or owner-operated farmland can be thought of as lower bounds for state 
totals.  
We chose conservation practices based on their effectiveness at reducing nitrogen and 
phosphorus. Cover crops, buffer strips, ponds, and land retirement through the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) most effectively reduce nitrogen loads, and the INRS highlights those 
same practices for reducing phosphorus loads but lists no-till as the best tool for reducing 
phosphorus loads (INRS 2017). 
We use a descriptive analysis to gain a big-picture perspective of Iowa farmland coupled 
with a statistical analysis to test several hypotheses of interest. We analyze Iowa farmland using 
various factors to make inferences about the distribution of the farmland and the use of the four 
conservation practices. We use the R package “Survey” to estimate the proportion of each group 
of interest that uses each conservation practice (Lumley 2019).  
In our statistical analysis, we test whether the proportion of farmland under a specific 
conservation practice differs across groups of landowners. We have two hypotheses: (1) adoption 
rates are lower on rented-out farmland than on owner-operated farmland; and (2) operator 
landowners use conservation practices on a greater share of their land than do NOLs because 
they are likely to have more current farming knowledge. We also evaluate whether conservation 
adoption differs across landowner characteristics (i.e., farming experience, residency status, age, 
and gender). We focus on gender because of evidence that women may be more conservation 
oriented than men (Eells and Soulis 2013).  
We use the two-group t-test to evaluate the null hypothesis that proportions of land with 





proportions differ across groups.6 We calculate the t-statistic for the difference in the proportions 
and report the p-values.7 We then break down these comparisons by various factors to evaluate 
the robustness of our results. 
We use county-level estimates to measure the effects of erosion potential on the adoption 
of different conservation practices and a simple linear regression to examine whether counties 
with greater shares of highly erodible land (HEL)8 have higher rates of conservation practices. 
We then report the slope coefficient for this relationship, the p-value associated with the t-test of 
this coefficient, and the R-squared. 
Results and Discussion 
As table 3.1 shows, no-till is used on 27% of Iowa farmland, making it the most prevalent 
of the four studied conservation practices. No-till is most concentrated in the Southwest and 
West Central CRDs—used on 56% and 40% of farmland, respectively—possibly due to erosion 
common in the loess-hill soils in western Iowa, as evidenced by the high percentages of HEL in 
that area. We test this idea by examining how conservation practice use differs by soil quality 
using counties’ HEL shares summary data from the Environmental Working Group.9 We find a 
positive relationship, suggesting that a 10 percentage-point increase in a county’s HEL 
                                                 
6 This describes the two-tailed test. When we have a strong reason to believe that the conservation practice rate 
should be greater for one group than another, we use a one-tailed hypothesis test, instead of the more conservative 
two-tailed test. 
7 Let 𝜃𝜃𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  be the share of land with conservation practice 𝑖𝑖 in group 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. For a two-tailed test  
 Ho: 𝜃𝜃1𝚤𝚤� = 𝜃𝜃2𝚤𝚤� 
 Ha: 𝜃𝜃1𝚤𝚤� ≠ 𝜃𝜃2𝚤𝚤� 






 , where 𝑉𝑉�𝜃𝜃1𝚤𝚤� − 𝜃𝜃2𝚤𝚤�� is the estimated variance: 
 𝑉𝑉�𝜃𝜃1𝚤𝚤� − 𝜃𝜃2𝚤𝚤�� = 𝑉𝑉1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑉𝑉2𝑖𝑖 − 2�𝑉𝑉1𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉2𝑖𝑖�
0.5 𝜌𝜌, where 𝑉𝑉1𝑖𝑖 and 𝑉𝑉2𝑖𝑖 are the estimated variances for 𝜃𝜃1𝚤𝚤�  and  𝜃𝜃2𝚤𝚤�, 




 is the correlation coefficient, where 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣12 is the covariance of  groups 1 and 2. 
8 HEL is defined by USDA as having an erodibility index of at least 8. 
9  Obtained via personal communication with Soren Rundquist, Director of Spatial Analysis, Environmental 
Working Group, based on data from USDA Farm Service Agency - Common Land Unit and the USDA National 





corresponds to a 3.7 percentage-point increase (2.4 to 5.1, 95% confidence interval) in the 
county’s share of no-till (p-value <0.001, R2 = 0.248) (figure 3.1a).  
Cover crops are used on 4% of Iowa’s farmland. Cover crops are used the most in the 
Southeast CRD (12% of farmland), followed by the Northeast and South-Central CRDs. All 
three districts are high in beef or dairy cattle production, possibly due to spillovers across 
farming enterprises—Plastina et al. (2018) finds that grazing a cover crop or harvesting it for 
forage adds around $20 per acre in cost savings on animal feed. Figure 3.1b shows on average, a 
10 percentage-point increase in a county’s HEL share corresponds to a 0.59 percentage-point 
increase in cover crops (0.02 to 1.2, 95% confidence interval; p-value = 0.043; R2 = 0.042). The 
presence of HEL appears to be a larger driving factor in the adoption of no-till than for cover 
crops.  
The positive relationship between HEL and the use of these conservation practices can be 
explained by compliance provisions that require farmers to agree on a conservation plan for HEL 
with their local NRCS office before participating in most Farm Service Agency or Risk 
Management Agency Programs or receiving federal government crop insurance subsidies. The 
dispersion in these regressions could be due to variations in recommendations given and funding 
provided by the decentralized NRCS offices. 
Buffer strips are used on 3% of land statewide and 6% of the land in the North Central 
and Northeast CRDs. Ponds are used on 2% of land statewide and are most prevalent in the 
South-Central CRD. Ponds are predominantly used in high livestock production areas, likely 
because they also provide water for cattle. 
In the next two subsections, we analyze conservation practice use across four categories: 





status (whether the landowner farms); (3) farming experience; and, (4) local versus absentee 
farmer. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of Iowa farmland by land leasing arrangements and 
landowner’s farming experience and residency status. Operator-landowners include full-time 
farmer landowners (farm and have no off-farm job) as well as part-time farmer landowners (farm 
and have off-farm employment). NOLs include owners who have never farmed and those retired 
from farming. Owner-operated land is farmed by the surveyed landowner or a co-owner, whereas 
rented-out farmland is farmed by a tenant who is not one of the owners. Absentee landowners do 
not reside in Iowa and local landowners reside in Iowa at least part of the year. Figure 3.2 shows 
that 53% of Iowa farmland is rented out by the landowner—only 37% is operated by a 
landowner. The remaining 10% is custom farmed or in government programs, such as the CRP. 
Among the rented farmland, 45% belongs to NOLs, and landowners that currently farm own the 
remaining 8%. Individuals who have never farmed own 25% of the state’s farmland. Almost 
one-third of farmland owned by those who have never farmed belongs to absentee landowners. 
Land Tenure 
We examine how no-till, cover crop, buffer strip, and pond use differ by land tenure, and 
test our hypothesis that conservation practices are used on a greater share of owner-operated 
farmland than rented-out farmland. No-till is a short-term conservation practice and may even be 
profitable in the short term (Ibendahl 2016); thus, we expect land rental arrangements not to 
hinder no-till adoption. Figure 3.3 shows the between-group t-test results when comparing the 
share of owner-operated and rented-out farmland under each conservation practice (1 vs. 2 in 
figure 3.2). At the state level, buffer strips and ponds are more prevalent on owner-operated land 
(p-values = 0.071 and 0.083), and there is no statistically significant difference for cover crops 
(p-value = 0.220), which may be due to the duration and expense of those practices and that 





20% of owner-operated farmland uses no-till (p-value=0.006), which is in line with the idea of 
no-till generating short-term benefits (Ibendahl 2016). We cannot directly infer from figure 3.3 
why no-till is more prevalent on rented land than owner-operated land—many factors affect 
conservation practice use and other variables may confound the effect of land tenure. Thus, we 
explore the effect of land tenure on conservation practice use by region, landholdings, and 
farming status.  
Land tenure results could be driven by regional specificities, since regional-level soil and 
land characteristics may affect conservation practice use and the share of rented land varies 
throughout the state. Figure 3.4 shows the share of no-till and cover crops on owner-operated and 
rented land by CRD. The statewide relationship between land tenure and no-till is consistent 
across CRDs—eight of nine CRDs have higher rates of no-till on rented farmland. However, the 
differences are statistically significantly different from zero only for the Central and South-
Central CRDs.  
The share of farmland with cover crops is higher on rented land in five CRDs, but only 
one is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. Figure 3.4, therefore, confirms that our 
results are not driven by an anomaly in any one particular district.  
We examine whether farming experience affects the share of owner-operated and rented 
farmland using no-till and cover crops. We use full- versus part-time farming as a proxy for 
farming operation scale, as full-time farmers operate a greater area of land than part-time 
farmers, in general.10 We do not consider retired landowners or those who have never farmed 
because they do not have owner-operated land. For our robustness checks, we compare the rates 
                                                 
10 We cannot tell from the survey whether full-time farmers operate more land than do part-time farmers, so we find 
evidence from the 2017 Census of Agriculture (NASS 2017) that, in Iowa, operators who do not work off farm 





of no-till and cover crops among groups 1.A vs. 2.A and 1.B vs. 2.B from figure 3.2. 
Landowners who farm full time use no-till on about the same proportion of their operated and 
rented-out land (29% vs. 31%, p-value = 0.865) (figure 3.5a). However, part-time farmer 
landowners use no-till on a significantly lower share of their owner-operated land (13%) than on 
the land they lease out to others (39%) (p-value = 0.002) (figure 3.5a), suggesting that lower no-
till adoption on owner-operated land is largely due to low adoption by part-time farmers. We 
believe this is due to part-time farmers typically operating less land than full-time farmers.11 
Several studies document that conservation-tillage adoption is positively correlated with area of 
farmland operated (Lee and Stewart 1983; Rahm and Huffman 1984; Epplin and Tice 1986; 
Gould et al. 1989; Sheikh et al. 2003; Davey and Furtan 2008; Vitale et al. 2011; Wade and 
Claassen 2017; Canales et al. 2018). Additionally, part-time farmers may not have as much time 
to engage with other farmers to learn about no-till, and may be less likely to adopt due to the 
learning curve associated with using no-till. Full- and part-time owner-operators have cover 
crops on a greater proportion of their owner-operated than rented-out land (7% vs. 3% and 3% 
vs. 1%, respectively), but the difference is only statistically significant for landowners who farm 
full time (p-values = 0.005 and 0.101, respectively) (figure 3.5b)12. 
Operator Status, Farming Experience, and Iowa Residency  
We analyze how operator status, farming experience, and residency affect conservation 
practice use (see table 3.2 for results), and find that operator-landowners have all four 
conservation practices on higher proportions of their farmland than do NOLs, which is 
significant because NOLs own 57% of the state’s farmland (Zhang et al. 2018). We expect 
                                                 
11 See footnote 8. 
12 We did not breakdown the results for cover crops because the relationship between land tenure and cover crop use 





landowners with farming experience to be more likely to use conservation practices because they 
likely possess more knowledge of them. We observe this expectation across all four conservation 
practices when we compare full-time farmer landowners with those who have never farmed, but 
not for part-time or retired farmers. This is especially concerning because landowners who have 
never farmed own 34% of the state’s farmland (Zhang et al. 2018).  
All four conservation practices are implemented on a lower share of absentee landowner 
acres when compared to local landowners (table 3.2c). Novel approaches may be needed to 
increase the effectiveness of outreach to NOLs, especially absentee NOLs, per Petrzelka and 
Armstrong (2015).  
Financial Characteristics 
Table 3.3 shows how conservation use differs by owner’s landholdings, percent of 
agriculture-based income, and percent of land that has been paid for. On average, landowners 
with more land tend to use no-till at a higher rate. Landowners with more than 809 ha (2000 ac) 
use no-till on 36% of their land compared to just 20% for those who own 0–40 ha (0 to 99 ac). 
There was no obvious pattern for cover crops, buffer strips, or ponds. 
Landowners with higher percentages of agriculture-based income have higher farmland 
shares of no-till and cover crops, with the exception of landowners with entirely agriculture-
based income. Among landowners with entirely agriculture-based income, 80% are operator 
landowners and 60% state that current income is the most important reason for owning farmland. 
There is not a clear relationship between percentage of land that is paid for and conservation 
practice use.  
Landowner Demographics 
Tables 3.4a, 3.4b, and 3.4c show Iowa’s conservation practice use by landowners’ age, 





landowner age and use of conservation practices. No-till is least prevalent on land owned by 
someone less than 55 years old, which contrasts with prior literature that suggests older farmers 
are less likely to adopt conservation practices because they may have less time to obtain the 
benefits (Prokopy et al. 2008). Landowners younger than 55 use cover crops and ponds at the 
highest rates.  
Gender does not have an effect on conservation practice adoption. Each practice is used 
on about the same proportion of farmland owned by males and females, which fails to support 
women landowners being more likely to adopt the conservation practices studied, despite 
findings that female landowners may be more conservation oriented than male landowners (Eells 
and Soulis 2013; Druschke and Secchi 2014). Druschke and Secchi (2014) find that although 
women are favorable toward conservation, they have lower knowledge levels about conservation 
practices, and Carolan (2005) finds female landowners may feel alienated and less comfortable 
making recommendations to male tenants. Women own 47% of Iowa farmland (Zhang et al. 
2018); thus, increasing outreach efforts to female landowners could have a sizable impact on 
conservation use.  
The relationship between education and conservation practice prevalence is unclear. 
There is a direct relationship for ponds—landowners with higher levels of education have ponds 
on a greater share of their land. However, the opposite is observed for no-till—high-school 
educated landowners have no-till on 34% of their land, compared to 21% for landowners with a 
graduate degree.13 This contrasts with past studies that find a positive relationship between 
education and conservation practice adoption (Prokopy et al. 2008). 
                                                 
13 This might be in part because less educated landowners tend to be operators. For instance, 45% of non-operators’ 
farmland belongs to someone with a college degree or higher, while only 36% of land owned by operators belongs 





Landowner Perspectives and Future Intentions 
We look at how conservation practice use is expected to evolve in the near future. Tables 
3.5a and 3.5b show that landowners are open to having more cover crops on their land—in the 
next five years, 18% are likely to use them and an additional 34% might use them. These two 
groups of landowners own 19% and 38% of Iowa farmland, respectively. It is unlikely that these 
farmers will adopt cover crops on all of their land; however, it would be a substantial increase 
from the 4% of farmland that is currently cover cropped. Only 10% of landowners state that they 
are likely to use no-till, 4% are likely to use buffer strips, and 2% are likely to use ponds over the 
next five years.  
Table 3.5c shows which policies could be effective at inducing landowners to adopt 
conservation practices. Tax credits or deductions in exchange for implementation of conservation 
practices would be most effective—45% of landowners state that they would be likely or very 
likely to adopt more conservation practices under such a policy. Thirty-six percent of landowners 
are likely or very likely to adopt more conservation practices if tax-free cost sharing is available, 
and 22% if land enrolled in conservation programs is excluded from the value of the estate for 
tax purposes. Enthusiasm among landowners is understandable; however, their future adoption 
will be contingent on whether and how these new policies are delineated. 
We also investigate landowners’ willingness to encourage their tenants to use cover 
crops. Barriers to conservation practices on rented land exist on both the landowner and tenant 
side (Carolan 2005); thus, we disentangle these factors by examining whether and in what ways 
landowners are willing to encourage their tenants to use more cover crops. As table 3.5d shows, 
about one-third of landowners would pay for a portion of cover crop planting costs, or increase 





important because prior literature cites high costs (Roesch-McNally et al. 2018) and short leases 
(Ranjan 2019; Carolan 2005) as barriers to tenants adopting conservation practices.  
Table 3.5d shows landowners’ willingness to help tenants use cover crops based on 
whether the landowner has any no-till farmland, which helps us determine if having a 
conservation practice on their land makes them more willing to help tenants adopt a different 
conservation practice on rented land. We find landowners’ willingness to help tenants is higher 
for no-till users than for those who don’t use no-till—42% (41%) of landowners using no-till are 
willing to give tenants a longer lease (pay for a portion of planting costs) in exchange for 
planting more cover crops, compared to just 12% (30%) of those without any no-till acres. This 
suggests there may be links between the adoption of no-till and cover crops. 
Table 3.6 shows landowners’ responses to an open-ended question about their main 
reasons for not using each conservation practice. For NOLs, the primary reason for not using no-
till is that they deem it not suitable for the land (46%), while the primary reason for not using 
cover crops is that the decision is up to the tenant (36%). 
For operator landowners, the primary reasons for not using no-till is that it hurts crop 
yield (17%), it is the tenant’s decision (15%), and that they tried it but did not like it (13%); and, 
the main reasons for not using cover crops are that it is the tenant’s decision (19%), the cost of 
terminating the cover crop is too high (19%), and they do not have time to plant them in the fall 
(16%). A relatively low proportion of NOLs indicate that no-till and cover crop use are decisions 
made solely by the tenant (6% and 36%, respectively), which suggests that landowners and 
tenants typically make joint conservation decisions on rented land. This confirms Arbuckle’s 






The overwhelming reason for not using buffer strips (84%) or ponds (88%) is that the 
landowner deems they are not needed on the land. These values are similar across owner-
operated and rented-out land. We also note that previous research such as Zhang et al. (2016) and 
Arbuckle and Roesch-McNally (2015) show that farmers’ conservationist identity and perceived 
efficacy of a conservation practice in reducing erosion or runoff is critical for higher adoption. 
Perceptions related to economics and factors of production drive many landowners’ 
reasons for not using cover crops; whereas land attributes are the main reason for not using 
buffer strips and ponds (and somewhat no-till). As research results emerge to address 
preconceived ideas, perceptions may evolve. For instance, while some landowners’ reasons for 
not using cover crops fall in line with previous literature, others’ are inconsistent with what has 
been observed. Roesch-McNally et al. (2018) find that barriers to adopting cover crops include 
costs and lack of time to plant them in the fall, which is similar to what the landowners stated. 
However, the sources of costs differ from what the landowners mentioned. Plastina et al. (2018) 
find cover crops’ greatest expense is planting costs—costs of terminating the cover crop are 
minor, as on average, farmers do not use additional inputs or machinery passes (e.g., extra 
tillage) than they use in absence of cover crops. NOLs cite termination costs as a reason for not 
using cover crops at a greater rate than operator landowners, suggesting a gap in perceptions 
between landowner types. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study provides three main contributions to the literature. First, we conduct a 
statistically representative examination of conservation practice use on Iowa farmland owned by 
operator landowners and NOLs. Our results demonstrate the importance of landowners’ farming 
experience, knowledge, value systems, and residency in driving conservation decisions, which is 





we provide statistical evidence that conservation practice adoption is lower on rented land for 
three practices (cover crops, buffer strips, and ponds/sediment basins), but not for no-till. Third, 
we shed light on landowners’ reasons for non-adoption and their views regarding current and 
alternative conservation policies and find that landowners would consider increasing 
conservation practice acreage if they could receive tax credits or deductions for doing so. 
Landowners seem open to having more cover crops on their land (INRS 2017), which 
would help meet INRS goals. The majority of landowners do not expect to increase adoption of 
no-till, buffer strips, or sediment basins, but over half of landowners, who own 57% of the state’s 
farmland, indicate they are open to increasing cover crop acreage on their land in the next five 
years. This does not imply that farmers will plant cover crops on all of this land, but it could 
represent a large increase from the 4% of farmland on which cover crops are currently used. Our 
results also show landowners’ reasons for not having cover crops on their land differs between 
operator landowners and NOLs, which suggests it is important for land-grant universities to 
provide more research-based extension services targeting NOLs to reduce the perception gap. 
Our work has several policy implications that complement the current state of 
conservation programs. The 2018 Farm Bill allocated an estimated $60 billion for conservation 
practices over ten years (Stubbs 2019), and it continues funding programs like EQIP, which 
promote conservation practices. Current conservation programs use a cost-share strategy; 
however, almost half of landowners indicate they would be somewhat or very likely to use more 
conservation practices on their land under a tax-credit policy. Meeting the goals of the INRS will 
require novel policies targeting absentee landowners, given the state’s landownership dynamics 





One shortfall of our approach is that many of the analyzed variables are likely to be 
confounded. We disentangle some of these effects, but our sample size limits the number of 
factors by which we can break down the results. Moreover, we do not have information on 
landowners’ rented-in farmland and cannot explore the tenants’ conservation preferences or 
decisions. While this research does not causally identify the effects that important factors such as 
land tenure have on adoption of conservation practices, it provides a big-picture understanding of 
conservation practice use in Iowa. Future work will investigate potential landowner effects in 
adopting conservation practices, for example whether using one practice increases likelihood of 
using others, or whether using a practice on operated land increases likelihood of using the same 
practice on rented land.  
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Figures and Tables  
 
Figure 3.1     County shares of highly erodible land vs. share of (a) no-till and (b) cover crops. 
 
Note: (a) p-value <0.001, R2 = 0.248 













Note: “Co-owner of NOL operates land” represents land for which the surveyed landowner did not farm the land, but 

































Figure 3.4     Iowa share of farmland with (a) no-till and (b) cover crops by land tenure, and crop-
reporting district. 






Figure 3.5     Share of owner-operated vs. rented out Iowa farmland that has (a) no-till and (b) 
cover crops by landowner farming status. 


























No-till 27% 16% 8% 19% 40% 29% 33% 56% 26% 26% 
Cover 
crops 4% < 1% 1% 8% 5% 2% 2% 4% 7% 12% 
Buffer 
strips 3% 2% 6% 6% 1% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 
Ponds 2% < 1% < 1% 2% 1% < 1% 2% 1% 5% 3% 
 








Table 3.2     Distribution of Iowa farmland under conservation practices by (a) landowner 
operator status, (b) farming experience, and (c) Iowa residency. 
(a) Operator landowner vs. NOL 
 No-till Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds 
Operator  29% 5% 4% 2% 
NOL 26% 4% 2% 1% 
(b) Landowners’ farming experience 
 No-till Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds 
Farms full time  33% 6% 4% 2% 
Farms part time  24% 3% 4% 2% 
Retired from farming  31% 4% 1% 1% 
Never farmed  23% 4% 2% 1% 
(c) Iowa residency 
 No-till Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds 
Year-around  28% 5% 3% 1% 
Part of year 32% 5% 3% 4% 














Table 3.3     Iowa farmland shares of conservation practices by landowner financial 
characteristics. 
(a) Landholdings (acres)  
 No-till Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds Number of responses 
0 to 49 20% 8% 3% 0% 59 
50 to 99 20% 0% 1% 0% 58 
100 to 249 26% 3% 4% 3% 190 
250 to 499 28% 4% 1% 1% 187 
500 to 999 32% 7% 3% 1% 158 
1000 to 1999 27% 8% 7% 3% 64 
2000 or more 36% 1% 1% 0% 19 
(b) Landowner's percentage of income from agriculture  
 No-till Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds Number of responses 
Less than 10 24% 2% 3% 1% 50 
11 to 40 27% 3% 2% 1% 57 
41 to 75 28% 4% 4% 2% 83 
76 to 99 46% 5% 1% 0% 55 
100 23% 2% 5% 3% 54 
(c) Landowner’s percentage of land paid for  
 No-till  Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds Number of responses 
0 to 33 29% 5% 2% 2% 146 
34 to 66 28% 7% 3% 2% 48 
67 to 99 32% 4% 4% 2% 59 
























Table 3.4     Shares of Iowa farmland under conservation practices by landowner (a) age, (b) 
gender, and (c) education. 
(a) Landowner’s percentage of land acquired by purchase 
 No-till Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds 
0 to 25 22% 2% 1% 1% 
25 to 50 17% <1% 1% <1% 
50 to 75 24% 7% 2% <1% 
75 to 100 31% 5% 4% 2% 
(b) Landowner’s percentage of land acquired by inheritance 
 No-till Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds 
0 to 25 30% 5% 4% 2% 
25 to 50 26% 9% 1% 1% 
50 to 75 18% <1% 2% <1% 
75 to 100 22% 2% 1% 1% 
(c) Landowner’s primary reason for owning the land 
 No-till Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds 
Income 29% 6% 3% 1% 
Investment 26% 2% 5% 1% 
Family/Sentimental 27% 4% 2% 2% 
Live On 21% <1% 1% <1% 












Table 3.5     Shares of Iowa farmland under conservation practices by landowner’s future 
intentions regarding conservation practices. 
(a) Distribution of landowners by expected prevalence of each practice in 
next five years 
 No-till Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds 
Yes  10% 18% 4% 2% 
No 64% 49% 84% 94% 
Maybe 26% 34% 12% 4% 
(b) Distribution of farmland by owner’s expected prevalence of each 
practice in next five years 
 No-till Cover crops Buffer strips Ponds 
Yes  14% 19% 5% 2% 
No 56% 43% 82% 93% 
Maybe 30% 38% 13% 6% 
(c) Distribution of landowners by likelihood of adopting conservation 
practices under various policy scenarios 
 Estate tax* Cost share* Tax credits* 
1 = Not at all likely 27% 24% 16% 
2 10% 5% 6% 
3 25% 20% 21% 
4 11% 15% 21% 
5 = Very likely 11% 21% 24% 
Unsure 15% 16% 13% 
(d) Distribution of farmland by owner's willingness to help tenant with 
cover crops and method by no-till prevalence 
Have no-till on land Do not have no-till on land 
 Longer lease Pay for portion of  planting cost Longer lease 
Pay for portion of  
planting cost 
Yes 42% 41% 12% 30% 
No 48% 35% 63% 43% 
Maybe 10% 24% 25% 26% 
 
*These policy scenarios would involve the value of land enrolled in conservation programs being excluded from the 
value of the estate for estate tax purposes, tax-free cost sharing being available for conservation practices, or 












Table 3.6     Distribution of Iowa farmland by landowner operator status and reason for not using 
no-till or cover crops. 
  No-till Cover crops 
 Operator NOL All Operator NOL All 
Not suitable for the land 12% 46% 21% – – – 
Hurts crop yield  17% 22% 18% 7% 3% 6% 
It's the tenant's decision 15% 6% 13% 19% 36% 25% 
Not applicable in my situation, all in pasture, 
all in CRP, hay ground 9% 14% 10% 9% <1% 6% 
Tried it, didn't like it 13% 3% 10% 5% <1% 3% 
Cost of terminating them in the spring is too 
high – – – 19% 27% 22% 
No time to get them planted in the fall, 
season is too short, too cold for cover crops, 
not enough manpower, workload too high 
– – – 16% 9% 14% 
Just don't want to, haven't gotten around to it 
yet, don't believe in it 10% 0% 8% 8% 7% 8% 
Uses minimum till, vertical tillage, strip till 10% 5% 9% – – – 
Don't need it, flat land, no erosion problem, 
don't have HEL 3% 3% 3% 5% 8% 6% 
Used for manure disposal 6% 2% 5% – – – 
Doesn't fit with my operation or erosion is 
controlled with my no-till and tiling already – – – 6% 3% 5% 
Doesn't know enough, need to do some more 
research, no one around here does them – – – 3% 5% 3% 
Don't have the right equipment 5% 0% 4% 1% <1% 1% 
Soil is too heavy, clayey, takes moisture out 
of soil – – – 2% 1% 2% 
Land is terraced, not set up to no-till, land not 
tiled well enough <1% <1% <1% – – – 
 
Note: Dashes mean that no landowner listed the response as a reason for not using the specified practice. 
Note: Buffer strips–Not needed on the land was primary reason for 83% of operator landowners’ farmland, 79% of 
NOLs’ farmland, and 84% of all farmland 
Note: Ponds–Not needed on the land was primary reason for 89% of operator landowners’ farmland, 85% of NOLs’ 











CHAPTER 4.    EFFICIENCY, FARM SIZE, AND LAND TENURE: THE EVOLUTION 
OF IOWA FARMS   
Wendiam P.M. Sawadgo 
Abstract 
In recent decades, agriculture has shifted to larger farms with increasing shares of rented 
farmland and older operators. In this paper, we use data envelopment analysis and a panel of 
Iowa farms to analyze the evolution of productive efficiency in corn production and how 
efficiency interacts with farm size, land tenure, and age of the operator. Two approaches are used 
to measure productive inefficiency with respect to the efficient farms. We measure both 
proportional overuse of all inputs and overuse of fertilizer. We find that farms have, on average, 
overall technical efficiency scores of 52% and fertilizer efficiency scores of 20%, with efficiency 
increasing with farm size and percentage of farmland rented. Older operators are less technically 
efficient than younger operators. Technical efficiency improved from 2011 to 2018. Scale 
efficiency is very high in Iowa corn production, averaging 93%. 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at how farm efficiency has evolved in Iowa during the 2010s, a period 
during which farm incomes began to decline in 2013. We focus on how agricultural production 
efficiency differs by land tenure, farm size, and operator age — three factors that have changed 
significantly over the past several decades. First, there has been a decline in the presence of small 
and medium farms (less than 1,000 acres): the share of farmland in large farms has increased 
from 30% to 50% between 1997 and 2017 in Iowa (United States Department of Agriculture, 
1997-2017). Therefore, it is increasingly critical to understand the impact of farm size on 
efficiency and assess the viability of small- and medium-sized farms. Second, the share of land 





and Sawadgo, 2018). Third, the average operator age has increased from 47.6 to 57.4 years over 
the same period (United States Department of Agriculture, 1997-2017). We analyze how these 
shifts have affected efficiency in agricultural production. 
When considering agricultural production efficiency, fertilizer is a critical input with 
effects beyond the farm. It has been suggested that farmers largely do not use best-management 
practices in applying fertilizer, as Ribaudo et al. (2011) estimate that in 2006 only 35% of US 
fields applied correct rates of nitrogen, accounting for relevant factors such as nitrogen available 
from the previous crop, applied nitrogen close to planting the crop, and used methods to reduce 
nutrient loss. Moreover, prior work has shown that farmers tend to apply fertilizer beyond levels 
the crop can uptake (Sheriff, 2005). Uncertainty regarding effects of nutrient application and 
risk-aversion may also affect the amount of applied fertilizer and the timing of application 
(Feinerman, Choi, and Johnson, 1990). Federal crop insurance programs are another factor that 
may affect farmers’ fertilizer use: while Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) find crop insurance 
tends to increase fertilizer use, Babcock and Hennessy (1996) and Smith and Goodwin (1996) 
see a decrease in fertilizer use when farmers purchase crop insurance. Moreover, Mieno, 
Walters, and Fulginiti (2018) suggest that accounting for actual production history — a factor in 
determining the level of guaranteed revenue in revenue protection insurance — increases optimal 
input use, since higher yields are also rewarded in future years. 
In this paper, we use data envelopment analysis and 3,416 observations from 2011 to 
2018 to calculate input-oriented technical efficiency scores for a sample of Iowa farms. We use 
both a radial measure that evaluates farms’ potential to proportionally reduce all inputs and a 
directional distance measure that estimates the potential to reduce fertilizer while holding other 





overall inefficiency in corn production, and the directional distance measure to determine the 
short-term potential to reduce fertilizer overuse, while leaving output unchanged. We then 
analyze how efficiency has changed over time in Iowa and break down efficiency by farm size, 
land tenure, and operator age. 
This research makes several contributions to the literature. First, we examine how 
efficiency differs by land tenure, which to our knowledge has not been analyzed in prior studies. 
Second, we provide evidence confirming prior findings of increased efficiency among larger 
farms, suggesting that farm consolidation may increase overall efficiency of the agricultural 
sector. Third, we add to the limited literature on farm productivity by examining efficiency in 
corn production in Iowa, the highest corn producing state. 
We find that farms had a technical efficiency of 56.6%, on average, with a sizable 
increase between the first and second half of the period studied. Larger farms are more efficient, 
when considering both the model that allows proportional reduction of all inputs and the model 
allowing reduction in fertilizer, suggesting the increase in farm size may have efficiency 
benefits. Next, efficiency tends to increase as the share of farmland rented increases, and 
efficiency decreases as the operators’ ages increase. These results suggest that land tenure, farm 
size, and operator age affect overall farm efficiency, in both the short- and long-term measures. 
We conclude that tenants may underuse some inputs compared to owner-operators as a way to 




Data envelopment analysis is a non-parametric method based on mathematical 





this paper, the decision-making units are farms. In data envelopment analysis, the input and 
output combinations for each farm are used to determine a frontier of efficient farms, by taking 
the convex hull. The convex hull contains the set of efficient farms and acts as a set of reference 
points for the farms within the frontier. In essence, each inefficient farm is assigned a linear 
combination of two efficient farms to represent its theoretically efficient input-output 
combination, or benchmark. Finally, efficiency values are calculated by comparing each farm’s 
actual input-output combination to its benchmark. 
We assume that all farms produce corn using a similar set of inputs. Let yit be the corn 
production and xit an m-dimensional vector of inputs used in corn production for farm i in year t. 
Let T represent the production set describing attainable combinations of corn production and 
inputs: 
 ,       (4.1) 
which can be rewritten as an input set: 
  .         (4.2) 
We calculate several measures of farms’ input-oriented technical efficiency. The first, 
TEitF, is a radial measure that gives the maximum proportional contraction of inputs, θ, each farm 
could achieve to efficiently produce the same level of output (Farrell, 1957). 
   TEitF = min{θ|θxit ∈ L(yit)}         (4.3) 
The following linear programming model is solved to calculate technical efficiency 










                          
                (4.4) 
 
 
where the λs are farm weights. The constant returns to scale assumption imposes that L(αyit) = 
αL(yit), which may be unrealistic in many settings since it assumes a constant average product. 
To relax this assumption, we calculate technical efficiency scores under variable returns 
to scale (VRS) by adding the additional constraint: 
            (4.5) 
to equation 4.4. 
In reality, there may be some inputs that we could reduce at a rate higher than θ. Thus, in 
addition to the radial measures, we calculate technical efficiency using the directional input 
distance function introduced by (Chambers, Chung, and Färe, 1996). Instead of assuming a 
proportional reduction of all inputs, the directional distance allows for reduction of some inputs, 
while holding other inputs quasi-fixed. The directional distance function, Di is: 
 Dit(xit,yit,gx) = sup{β|(xit − βgx) ∈ L(yit)},         (4.6) 
where gx is the reference feasible input bundle that could produce the same output. 
The linear programming problem for calculating the directional input distance function 












Lastly, we calculate how close farms are to the optimal scale determined by the input-
output combination that maximizes average product. Scale efficiency is calculated as the ratio of 
technical efficiency under constant returns to scale and technical efficiency under variable 
returns to scale: 
          (4.8) 
The efficiency scores are calculated for each farm using the DEA ‘Benchmarking’ 
package in R (Bogetoft, Otto, and Otto, 2019). 
Data 
We use data assembled by the Iowa Farm Business Association. The dataset includes 
accrued income statements and balance sheets for 601 farm enterprises from 2011-2018, 
providing information on operated acreage, outputs, revenues, and input expenditures. For the 
purpose of this study, we focus on corn and inputs used in its production. Output and input 
quantities are expressed on a per acre basis, to avoid skewing the distribution of efficiency scores 
towards the smallest farms that, by definition, have the smallest farmland areas in production. 
Furthermore, since land has the slowest adjustment rate to changing market or production 
conditions (Yang and Shumway, 2016), treating land as another variable input would impose a 
strong inertia in the radial efficiency scores through time, underestimating the true change in the 





We use input price data from the 2011-2018 Estimated Costs of Crop Production in Iowa 
published by Iowa State University Extension and Outreach (Ag Decision Maker File A1-20, 
various issues) to deflate expenditures and calculate input quantities for each operation. Prices 
for hired labor, seed, and fertilizer are obtained directly from Ag Decision Maker File A1-20, 
while price indices for machinery, fuel, herbicide, and insecticide are calculated using annual per 
acre values from the same publications. The fertilizer price index is calculated as a weighted 
average of nitrogen, phosphate, and potash prices, using 180 lb. nitrogen, 82 lb. phosphate, and 
66 lb. potash per acre as weights. The machinery price index is calculated as the sum of the fixed 
costs for pre-harvest machinery, combine, and grain cart. The price for operator labor is obtained 
from the Ag Decision Maker C1-10 File. 
Quantities for inputs are calculated by dividing the total expense on each input by its 
price in the given year. Labor is measured as the sum of operator and hired labor, and we assume 
that operators work 173 hours per month. Summary statistics for the input and output quantities 
can be found in table 4.1. We include five inputs in the data envelopment analysis: labor, 
machinery, fertilizer, and materials, an intermediate good, composed of seeds, herbicide, 
insecticide, and fuel. Land is accounted for implicitly by expressing all quantities on a per-acre 
basis. 
Because data envelopment analysis is sensitive to the presence of outliers, we use scatter 
plots and box plots to check for input and output values that were likely incorrectly entered into 
the financial software.1 After removing 728 observations containing outliers, 3,416 observations 
remain.2 
                                                 
1 Observations were removed if the annual per-acre value was outside of 150-300 bushel corn yield, 0.001-0.1 
months of labor, 0.4-6 machinery index, 0-30 gallons of fuel, 40-700 pounds of fertilizer, 10,000-70,000 seeds, 0-3 
insecticide index, or 0-6 herbicide index. Only farms that had 100-3,000 acres in corn production were included. 







Efficiency scores were estimated in a model calculating a proportional reduction of all 
inputs. We first evaluate results of the model of five inputs. Technical efficiency scores under 
both variable returns to scale and constant returns to scale, as well as the calculated scale 
efficiency scores are presented in table 4.2. We find that farms are 96.6% scale efficient, on 
average. However, due to the importance of farmland in corn production, and the difficulty in 
reducing or acquiring farmland, we prefer a model of four inputs normalized by land, or 
expressed per acre.3 Thus all subsequent results (except for scale efficiency) are from a model 
where inputs and output are measured per acre and technical efficiency is measured under 
variable returns to scale, to allow for flexibility. 
The average technical efficiency scores for each year are reported (table 4.3). Over the 
entire sample, farms could have used just 56.6% of their inputs to achieve the same production 
level, on average. As expected, these values for the per-acre model are lower than those from the 
model using total output, because it is much more difficult for farmers to reduce land than to 
reduce all non-land inputs, while holding output constant. 
There is an increase in technical efficiency between the first and second half of the period 
(52.4% vs. 60.5%). However, our finding of an increase in technical efficiency over time differs 
from the result of Mugera and Langemeier (2011), who find a decrease in technical efficiency 
from 1993 to 2007. Agricultural financial conditions represent a potential reason for this 
                                                 
farmers in our dataset, on average, are slightly younger (56.7 vs. 57.4 years), have lower yields (195 vs. 199 
bushels/acre), grow more corn (461 vs. 295 acres), and rent a greater share of their farmland (57% vs. 51%). 
However, this data is meant to largely represent mid-sized farms, and the farms included in the analysis are limited 
to between 100 and 3,000 acres of corn production. 
3 This is evidenced by the smaller slack values in the model of four inputs. The slacks expressed as a percentage of 
the mean value for labor, machinery, fertilizer, and materials were 20%, 10%, 9%, and 3% in the model of five 





difference. During the period in our sample, net farm income increased until 2013 and decreased 
thereafter, whereas net farm income was relatively stable throughout the period analyzed by 
Mugera and Langemeier (2011). Scale efficiency exhibits a similar but less drastic pattern over 
time than technical efficiency (tables 4.2 and 4.3). 
Directional Distance 
To allow for flexibility, the remaining results are presented under the assumption of 
variable returns to scale. In this section, we analyze the potential reduction in fertilizer to 
produce the same output, holding other inputs constant. Over the entire sample, the average farm 
could have used just 20.1% of its fertilizer to produce its level of output (table 4.4). This finding 
supports the idea that a non-trivial segment of mid-sized commercial farms overuse inputs in 
production, especially fertilizer. Similar to the results in the radial model, there is an increase in 
technical efficiency between the first and second halves of our sample. 
Land Tenure 
We divide farms into three land tenure groups: full-owners own all the land they operate, 
full-renters rent all the land they operate, and part-owners farm both owned and rented land. We 
further break down part-owners into farmers who rent half of their farmland or less and those 
who rent more than half of their farmland. Table 4.5 presents results of technical efficiency by 
land tenure. We find that full-renters and part-owners who rent most of their land are most 
technically efficient (58.8%), followed by part-owners who rent less than half of their land 
(55.5%), and full-owners (51.9%). A similar pattern is observed regarding the efficiency of 
fertilizer use, but with a greater distinction between groups. Full-owners could have the greatest 
reduction of fertilizer and full-renters the least. Scale efficiency scores are approximately equal 





While the shift to rented land (as described in chapter 3) could be a result of farmers’ 
pursuit of higher productivity, it could simply reflect dynamics and incentives of ownership. 
Following findings from chapter 3, owners may be more willing to make investments in 
farmland than tenants, which is reflected by higher use of inputs that have a carryover to future 
years. For instance, owners may have more incentives than tenants to over apply nitrogen, and 
may do so to ensure they have fertile fields and a higher actual production history for crop 
insurance purposes in the future. Given that an increasing share of Iowa farmland is rented 
(Zhang, Plastina, and Sawadgo, 2018), our findings that corn producers who rent more of their 
farmland are relatively more technically efficient in fertilizer application seems to suggest that 
the environmental footprint of corn production has been declining through time. 
Looking at the summary statistics broken down by land tenure (table 4.6), there is a 
notable difference in per acre fertilizer use, with full-owners using 365 lb. and full-renters using 
312 lb., compared to the 328-lb. benchmark used in determining the fertilizer index in this study. 
Yield and other inputs do not follow a discernible pattern across land tenure groups. 
Farm Size  
We use corn acreage as the measure of farm size, and classify farms into three categories: 
small (less than 300 acres), medium (300 to 600 acres), and large (at least 600 acres). Technical 
efficiency scores by operated corn acreage are presented in table 4.7. Large farms have the 
highest technical efficiency when considering reduction of all inputs (60.7%), followed by 
medium farms (57.7%), and small farms (52.8%). A similar pattern is observed when 
considering the efficiency in fertilizer use. The finding of higher technical efficiency for larger 
farms is consistent with prior work (Mugera and Langemeier, 2011; Weersink, Turvey, and 






Scale efficiency scores by farm size are presented in table 4.8. Over the entire sample, 
medium farms are the most scale efficient, but the average hides the fact that small farms were 
the most scale-efficient group in the period of increasing farm income, and large farms the most 
scale-efficient group in periods of declining farm income. This result differs from the findings of 
Mugera and Langemeier (2011), who found small farms to be the most scale efficient and large 
farms the least scale efficient. 
Operator Age 
We divide farmers into three age groups: younger than 50 years of age, 50 to 65 years of 
age, and 65 years of age or older. We find that younger farmers are, on average, the most 
technically efficient (table 4.9). Farmers younger than 50 years of age have the highest technical 
efficiency (60.5%), followed by those 50 to 65 years of age (56.3%), and farmers 65 or older 
(53.5%) in the model allowing for a proportional reduction of all inputs. The results for fertilizer 
efficiency follow a similar pattern, but there is no meaningful relationship between operator age 
and scale efficiency. 
Our results follow prior findings of declines in farm productivity as age increases. In a 
nationwide analysis of eight editions of the Census of Agriculture (1978 to 2012), Tauer (2017) 
finds a concave relationship, with operators between 25 and 34 years of age to be most 
productive, and declines thereafter. However, due to increases in the age distribution of farmers, 
we do not have an adequate number of farmers younger than 25 in our sample to make any 
meaningful comparisons. The observed relationship is troubling, given the aging population of 
farmers. 
Conclusion 
In this study, we analyze how technical efficiency in Iowa corn production has evolved 





and calculate technical efficiency for 3,416 farm-year observations, using two methods. First, we 
use a radial distance measure, which calculates the maximum proportional reduction in inputs 
possible to maintain the level of output. Second, we use a directional input distance measure to 
determine the amount of fertilizer a farm could reduce, holding other inputs fixed, to produce the 
same level of output. We consider the radial measure to represent the long-term potential to 
reduce overall inefficiency in corn production, and the directional distance measure the short-
term potential to reduce fertilizer overuse. We evaluate how technical efficiency varies by land 
tenure, farm size, and operator age. 
We find that the average farm’s technical efficiency is 56.6%. There is a notable jump 
between 2011 to 2014 (52.4%) and 2015 to 2018 (60.5%), which coincides with the decline in 
farm incomes that began in 2013. We find that smaller farms are less efficient than large farms, 
in both the short- and long-term measures. Over the past several decades, there has been an 
increase in the prevalence of large farms at the expense of mid-sized farms. The results of this 
study are consistent with the idea that farm consolidation in recent decades may have been 
driven by higher efficiency of larger farms. Technical efficiency increases with share of farmland 
rented, both in reduction of all inputs and reduction of fertilizer. Lastly, technical efficiency 
decreases with farm operator age. 
One shortcoming of this research is that land tenure, farm size, and operator age are 
correlated. Younger farmers operate a greater number of corn acres, but a greater proportion of 
their farmland is rented, compared to older farmers. Thus, it is difficult to determine the drivers 
in differences in technical efficiency. Future work could look to disentangle the effects of size of 





would determine how technical efficiency translates into economic efficiency after accounting 
for prices. 
With increased pressure to encourage agriculture to reduce its environmental 
externalities, policymakers should be aware of factors that affect fertilizer use. Prior work has 
found input tax policies to be more effective at reducing fertilizer than a tax on the crop 
produced (Sun, Delgado, and Sesmero, 2016). Our results suggest that such a fertilizer tax may 
have differential impacts across farmer age, size, and land-tenure groups. The present analysis is 
intended to help design farm and environmental policy to promote efficiency and environmental 
stewardship in corn production. 
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CHAPTER 5.    GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Agricultural pollution continues to intensify water-quality issues in Iowa, magnifying the 
importance of limiting nutrient loss to waterways. However, there is evidence that farmers over-
apply some nutrients, and the use of conservation practices such as cover crops remains low, 
even though these practices have on-farm benefits in addition to their public benefits. Thus, the 
three studies presented in this dissertation examine factors that affect the rate at which farmers 
use agricultural practices that can mitigate nutrient pollution. The preceding three chapters 
highlight the crucial role that agri-environmental policy and land tenure play in affecting 
conservation-practice use. 
Agri-environmental policy has been at the center of the effort to increase conservation 
practice adoption. Cost-share programs give farmers payments in exchange for implementing 
conservation practices, and have been shown to be effective at increasing cover crop use in Iowa. 
In chapter 2, we estimate that cost-share recipients planted cover crops to 15% more of their 
farmland than they would have in absence of payment. Moreover, these programs have been a 
relatively low-cost method to reduce nitrogen pollution. Additional agri-environmental policies 
could aim to target landowners – especially NOLs – as opposed to farm operators. Results from 
chapter 3 suggest that landowners would most like to see a program in which they could receive 
tax credits or deductions for using conservation practices, with 45% of the state’s farmland 
belonging to landowners who state that they would be likely to increase their acreage in 
conservation practices under such a policy. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the large share of rented farmland could contribute to 
the low adoption of conservation practices, as tenants may not be willing to take on the short-





Furthermore, the high rate of ownership by NOLs – who may lack knowledge about farming 
techniques and the benefits of conservation practices – can exacerbate this issue. Chapter 3 adds 
some evidence in support of these two hypotheses, finding (1) lower use of cover crops, buffer 
strips, and sediment basins on rented land compared to owner-operated land, and (2) lower rates 
of no-till, cover crops, buffer strips, and sediment basins on farmland owned by NOLs compared 
to the farmland owned by current farm operators. However, we find that no-till is used at a 
higher rate on rented land than it is used on owner-operated land. 
The importance of land tenure is not limited to conservation practice use. In chapter 4, I 
examine how land tenure affects input use in general, with a focus on fertilizer. I find that full-
renters are more technically efficient at using fertilizer in corn production and use about 30 fewer 
pounds of fertilizer per acre than do full-owners, on average.  
Moving forward, there is room for researchers to continue to identify factors that affect 
farmers’ use of conservation practices, to help meet INRS goals. Future research could look at 
whether the effectiveness of cost-share programs differs with respect to the per-acre payment 
rate. In 2017, IDALS implemented the Cover Crop - Crop Insurance Demonstration Pilot – a 
program in which enrolled farmers receive a five-dollar discount on their crop insurance 
premium for cover-cropped acres. Additional analysis is needed to determine whether such a 
small payment (relative to the average $26 payment we observed in the data used in chapter 2) is 





APPENDIX.    COST-SHARE PROGRAM INFORMATION 
Cost-share programs differ in their payments, requirements, and maximum length of 
participation. The payment amount for most programs depends on the cover crop mixture used, 
and farmers are required to follow seeding guidelines set by the National Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS). Moreover, programs typically have annual sign-up periods, as 
opposed to longer contracts. The Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship 
(IDALS) is the main source of cost-share for farmers in the present analysis. Through IDALS, 
first-time cover crop users are eligible for $25 per acre and experienced cover crop users are 
eligible for $15 per acre. Federal funding is also available through the Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program, Conservation Stewardship Program, and Regional Conservation Partnership 
Program.  
The main sources of cost-share funding for farmers came from the Iowa Department of 
Agriculture and Land Stewardship (IDALS), Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), 
and Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP). While IDALS and EQIP funding are suitable for 
both new and experienced farmers, CSP is tailored for farmers already using conservation 
practices but looking to increase their conservation use. 
Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship 
First-time cover crop users are eligible for $25 per acre and continuing users are eligible 
for $15 per acre, on up to 160 acres subject to maintenance agreements through the Iowa Water 
Quality Initiative.  
Environmental Quality Incentive Program 
The farmer is paid up to three annual payments, with the payment amount differing by 





adopted practice, and applications during the signup period are chosen using a ranking tool in 
which  points are assigned for different environmental benefits.  
Chemical or Mechanical Kill Species  
A grass/legume/brassica cover crop or cover crop mix is planted within 30 days of the 
cash crop harvest. The cover crop is allowed to reach early to mid bloom before the cover crop is 




Small grain or small grain/brassica mix is planted within 30 days of the cash crop harvest. 
Seed is planted with no-till drill. The cover crop species winterkills. 
Payment: $30.15/acre 
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) 
The CSP gives farmers an annual payment in exchange for producing environmental 
benefits. Farmers work with their local NRCS agronomist to augment their conservation efforts 
in their crop rotation. The farmer fills out documentation of their ongoing practices and the 
application for the adopted practice. The NRCS reviews the application, and given the proposed 
changes estimates the environmental benefits using the Conservation Measurement Tool to 
assign conservation points. These points are used for ranking applications and determining 
payments. The CSP has enhancement activities that address various environmental aspects. The 






Cover crops are used to reduce or replace synthetic nitrogen application. Legume cover 
crops are selected to credit at least 40 pounds of nitrogen per acre. The enhancement is 
considered to be adopted when the cover crop has been planted to achieve the credit.  
Documentation required: 
1. Map of field where enhancement was applied 
2. Type of cover crop planted 
3. Calculations to estimate available nitrogen 
4. Additional nitrogen application rate 
5. Realistic yield goals 
PLT20 
Cover crops are used to suppress weed seed germination and add carbon to the carbon 
pool. The farmer seeds a high-residue cover crop between each crop in the rotation, excluding 
double-cropped acreage. The cover crop must be planted within date range determined by NRCS 
agronomist, following a seeding rate. Cereal grain cover crops must be top-dressed with nitrogen 
as determined by the NRCS. The cover crop must reach maturity level (growth stage) to ensure 
full soil coverage for 3 months. The cover crop can be terminated using chemical or non-
chemical methods. The crop rotation must maintain a Soil Tillage Intensity Rating (STIR) less 
than 10 as determined with RUSTL2. 
Documentation required: 
1. Cover crop or cover crop mix, seeding rate, and date planted 
2. Nitrogen top-dress rate and date 






Use of multiple cover crop species or cultivars with different maturity dates, selected 
from the NRCS state-specific list.  
Documentation required: 
1. Cover crop species, date planted, and termination method and date 
2. Date and quantity of N fertilizer 
3. Crop planted after cover crop and method 
4. Grazing plan (if applicable) 
5. Map of field  
6. Photos showing cover crop mixes 
SQL12 
Use of cover crops during all non-crop production times for annual crops. The cover 
crops is planted as soon as feasible after harvest using seeding rates that achieve uniform stand 
and rapid ground coverage. Alternatively, it may be seeded into a standing crop if adequate to 
achieve an adequate crop stand. The cover crop cannot be harvested or grazed and each cover 
crop in the rotation must meet one of the following and two over the course of the rotation: 
1. High biomass cover crop for erosion control and improved soil organic matter 
2. Legume cover crop for N fixation 
3. Non-legume with deep root system to capture or recycle residual nitrogen 
4. Weed suppression  
5. Biodiversity improvement to attract beneficial or trap damaging insects 
Documentation: 
1. Crop rotation records 





3. Photos of cover crop showing timing and method of establishment and extent of 
growth before termination 
4. Seed and legume inoculant tags and receipts 
WQL10 
Plant cover crops such as cereal rye, barley, forage radish, or sorghum sudan that 
scavenge residual nitrogen in the soil after harvest and supply nutrients to the subsequent crop. 
Documentation: 
1. Map of field 
2. Cover crop species, planting date, and seeding rate 
3. Annual crop planted 
4. N application rate for annual crop and justification for increase or decrease of N 
rate 
5. Treatment acres 
WQL33 
Terminate cover crop with non-chemical methods to reduce detrimental water quality 
impact from herbicides. Crop is killed by mowing, roller-crimping, undercutting, or weather kill 
 Documentation: 
1. Cover crop, planting date, and termination date 
2. Annual crop planted 
3. N application rate and date  
4. Cash crop and planting method 
5. Map of field 
6. Photos of fields showing roller-crimping (if applicable) 
 
